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ESSAY I 
 
 
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF NITROGEN FERTILIZER USING RANDOM 
PARAMETER MODELS1 
 
Abstract 
The parameters of yield response functions can vary by year. Past studies usually assume 
yield functions are nonstochastic or ‘limited’ stochastic. In this study, we estimate rye-
ryegrass yield functions where all parameters are random. Optimal nitrogen 
recommendations are calculated for two yield response functions: linear response plateau and 
Spillman-Mitscherlich. Nonstochastic models are rejected in favor of stochastic parameter 
models. The stochastic models lead to smaller recommended levels of nitrogen, but the 
economic benefits of using fully stochastic models are small since expected profit functions 
are relatively flat for the stochastic models. 
  
                                                          
1
 This paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics. It is included in this dissertation in the format requirement of JAAE. 
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Introduction  
Optimal nitrogen (N) fertilizer recommendations are often obtained by fitting yield response 
models to yield data (Lanzer and Paris 1981; Cerrato and Blackmer 1990; Babcock 1992; 
Makowski and Wallach 2002; Mooney et al. 2008). Unfortunately, model based nitrogen rate 
recommendations are vulnerable to misspecification of the yield response functions. This 
misspecification can affect the accuracy of optimal N recommendations, and any errors can 
reduce the profit of producers who follow the recommendations and potentially have 
negative environmental effects if excess N is applied. Of particular interest here is the 
possible misspecification of assuming parameters are constant when they are stochastic. The 
objective of this study is to determine expected net return maximizing nitrogen rate 
recommendations for a winter cereal rye (S.cereale)/ryegrass (Lolium multiflorum Lam) 
forage crop based on models that differ in functional form and whether or not model 
parameters are assumed stochastic. 
Previous work on crop response to nitrogen fertilizer has usually used either limiting 
nutrient response functions or polynomial models. Plateau functional forms tend to best fit 
data from field studies (Heady and Pesek 1954, Lanzer and Paris 1981, Grimm, Paris, and 
Williams 1987). Past studies have often assumed that the parameters of the yield function are 
nonstochastic or ‘limited’ stochastic (some parameters are considered stochastic and others 
are not), and that all model errors are independent. This often leads to the estimation of the 
mean yield function as conditional on fertilizers, but neglects the possible interaction 
between weather events in a given year with the associated fertilizer response. Research 
suggests, however, that parameters of yield response functions can vary by year (Cerrato and 
Blackmer 1990, Makowski and Wallach 2002, and Tembo et al 2008). Given that the 
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parameters of the yield response function can vary by year, estimating a random parameter 
model could give a more realistic model of producers’ profit expectations.  
 Random parameter models have been suggested by Berck and Helfand (1990), Paris 
(1992), Makowski and Wallach (2002), and Tembo et al (2008). Berck and Helfand (1990), 
and Paris (1992) consider linear response plateau models where the intercept and plateau 
parameters are random, but without random effects. Tembo et al adds uncorrelated random 
effects to the intercept and plateau, but not to the slope. The Tembo et al. approach was 
successfully used to model wheat forage data (Kaitibie et al. 2003; Taylor et al. 2010) as well 
as wheat yield data (Biermacher et al. 2009). Only Makowski and Wallach (2002) treat all of 
the model parameters as random. Makowski and Wallach (2002) consider a linear-plus-
plateau function in which wheat yield response is related to N uptake, and nitrogen uptake is 
related to applied nitrogen.  
We consider three crop response functions: the simple linear response plateau (LRP), 
the Spillman-Mitscherlich, and the quadratic; and we make all model parameters random. 
Our random parameter model lets parameters vary stochastically by year. The data used are 
annual rye-ryegrass forage data collected from a long-term nitrogen fertilization experiment 
in south-central Oklahoma. We conduct nested likelihood ratio tests to choose between 
nonstochastic and stochastic models (Greene, 2008), and evaluate the economic value of 
using the alternative models by comparing expected profit. The ultimate goal of this study is 
to evaluate the economic importance of using a random parameter model to make optimal 
nitrogen rate recommendations for cool season cereal rye (S.cereale)-ryegrass (Lolium 
multiflorum Lam) forage producers in southern Oklahoma.  
11 
 
Determining the Profit Maximizing Level of Nitrogen Fertilizer 
Consider a risk-neutral forage producer whose objective is to maximize expected net returns 
from winter cereal rye-ryegrass forage. The producer seeks to maximize expected net return 
above nitrogen cost: 
(1)            max 	|  	   
                                   s.t.   	  ,   0, 
where 	 is the producer’s net return at time t, 	 is the forage yield, N is the level of applied 
nitrogen, r is the price of applied nitrogen fertilizer, and p is the price of forage. Yield 
expectations are obtained through the production function F(N). We consider the three 
production functional forms in turn.  
Linear Response Plateau  
A stochastic linear response plateau function is specified as 
            (2)      	  min  		 ,    !  "	  #	  $	, 
where 	
 
is the forage yield of cereal rye-ryegrass from the ith plot in year %, 	
 
is the level 
of nitrogen fertilizer,  !
 
is mean plateau yield, 	 is the slope random effect, "	 is the plateau 
year random effect, #	
 
is the (intercept) year random effect, and $	
 
is a random error term 
that is normally distributed and independent of the three random effects. The intercept 
random effect is added to the whole equation rather than just to β0 so that the model of 
Tembo et al. (2008) is a special case. The variance parameters #	, 	, and "	 are correlated 
and normally distributed. Makowski and Wallach (2002) use a model 
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where ', ,  !(~*, +. Our model is parameterized differently, but is equivalent to 
Makowski and Wallach (2002). 
The random effect #	 shifts the whole function up or down, which could be due to a 
variety of weather factors, insects or disease. The slope random effect 	 may be due to 
nitrogen losses from leaching, soil or weather characteristics, or weed pressure during critical 
growth periods. The plateau year random effect "	 shifts the yield potential from applying 
more nitrogen, which mostly varies due to rainfall in a given year. For example, when 
growing conditions are favorable in a given year, the plateau yield increases as does the 
amount of nitrogen that the plants can use. When the model is nonstochastic, the random 
variables "	 and 	 will be zero, but #	 may still be included.  
The function is continuous, but its derivatives do not exist with respect to either its 
parameters or N at the knot point where the response and the plateau are joined, but the 
derivatives of expected yield do exist for the stochastic model. Choosing the level of nitrogen 
(N*) that maximizes equation (1) follows the rule from economic theory that marginal 
factor/input cost (MFC) should equal marginal expected product value (MVP).With a 
nonstochastic linear response plateau function, equation (2) will exhibit constant positive 
marginal product when  ! ,    . If MVP > MFC, then nitrogen should be applied until 
MVP=MFC. Increasing N beyond the level required to reach  ! will generate negative 
marginal returns. Therefore, with the nonstochastic LRP, N* would either be the level 
required to reach the plateau (!) or zero: 
                         3               .   /!,            if VMP , 450 ,                  otherwise. > 
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For the stochastic LRP, the random variable #	 in equation (2) enters linearly, and 
therefore it drops out after taking expectations. Therefore, the expectation of y becomes  
          (4)              	  ?min'    	,  !  "	(@. 
Since 	 and "	 are random and correlated, the expectation in (4) requires integrating with 
respect to 	 and "	, which defines a double integral that must be solved numerically: 
          (5) 	  A?min'    	,  !  "	(@B	, "	C	C"	 , 
where B	, "	 is the multivariate normal probability density function. Tembo et al. (2008) 
use the approach developed for Tobit models and obtain N* by evaluating a univariate 
normal probability density function since they do not allow the slope to be random. 
Makowski and Wallach (2002) solve the integral using Monte Carlo integration. The 
integration in (5) can also be solved using other numerical approximation methods such as 
Gaussian cubature (DeVuyst and Preckel 2007). We use Monte Carlo integration to solve the 
double integral. The optimal level of N is obtained by direct non-linear optimization (grid 
search would also work since there is only one choice variable). 
Spillman-Mitscherlich  
The Spillman-Mitscherlich yield response function is an exponential function (Spillman 
1923). A univariate stochastic form of this function is  
                 6         	  E  F  	exp H  "		  #	  $	, 
where E is the maximum or potential yield obtainable by applying nitrogen under the 
conditions of the experiment; F is the increase in yield due to applied nitrogen; H is the ratio 
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of successive increments in output E to total output y; #	, 	, and "	 are correlated random 
effects; and $	 is the independent error term. When the model is nonstochastic, the random 
variables 	 and "	 are zero, but #	 is still included.  
Equation (6) shows that as the application rate of nitrogen increases, the yield 
increases at a decreasing rate and asymptotically approaches a maximum as the application 
rate (theoretically) approaches infinity. The function does not strictly adhere to the law of the 
minimum like in the case of the linear response plateau (allows for convex rather than right-
angled isoquants), but unlike the polynomial functions, it exhibits a plateau. The function 
exhibits sufficient flexibility to accommodate from near perfect substitution to near zero 
factor substitution if the data and production process so suggest (Frank, Beattie, and 
Embleton1990).  
The optimal level of nitrogen is obtained by substituting (6) into (1) and then solving 
the optimization problem. For the nonstochastic Mitscherlich yield function, the optimal 
level of nitrogen (N*) is obtained by solving the first order condition for N, which gives  
                      (7)        .  IJ Kln M
N !⁄ 
JP QR. 
For the stochastic Mitscherlich, since the random variables 	 and "	 do not enter linearly in 
(6), the expectation of y is obtained by numerically solving the integral:  
                    8       	  TE  F  	 expH  "	 B	, "	C	C"	 . 
The double integral is solved using Monte Carlo integration. Monte Carlo approximates (8) 
with a summation, which is then substituted into (1) and the optimal level of nitrogen is then 
obtained by nonlinear optimization.  
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Quadratic Response 
A random parameter quadratic response model is specified as 
  (9) 	      "		  U  		U  #	  $	 , 
where  is the intercept parameter whose position (value) can be shifted up or down from 
year to year by the year random effect #	,  is the linear response coefficient with random 
effect parameter "	, U
 
is the quadratic parameter whose value can be shifted up or down by 
the random effect 	, and $	
 
is the independent error term assumed to be normally distributed. 
The random effects "	, 	
 
and #	
 
are correlated and normally distributed. When the model is 
nonstochastic, the random effects "	  and  	 would be zero, but #	 is still included.  
Since (9) is continuously twice differentiable and all the random parameters enter in 
(9) linearly, (1) gives the same analytical solution for both stochastic and nonstochastic 
models. Note that for the nonstochastic model, the values of "	, 	
 
and #	 are all zero. Hence 
the problem of calculating N* simplifies to: 
(10)              .    / 2U⁄ . 
 
Model Fit and Selection Criteria 
Likelihood ratio tests are used to choose between stochastic and nonstochastic models 
(Greene 2008). The calculated likelihood ratio statistics have a chi-square distribution under 
the null hypothesis. To choose between competing model functional forms, Davidson and 
Mackinnon (1981) suggest using formal non-nested tests such as the J-test and P-test. These 
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tests, however, cannot be used here since they can only be used when the nonoverlapping 
parameters are associated with fixed effects.  
The literature on non-nested hypothesis tests provides a variety of criteria to select the 
model that best fits the data. When competing non-nested models are fully parameterized and 
estimated by maximum likelihood, a popular criterion is the adjusted model log-likelihood 
such as AIC (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwarz 1978). However, these criteria do not take 
into account whether the differences in the penalized log-likelihoods are statistically 
significant or not. When observations are independent and identically distributed, a test can 
be done following Vuong (1989). Pollak and Wales (1991) introduced the Likelihood 
Dominance Criterion (LDC). The LDC provides rationale to compare two models based on 
the difference in estimated likelihoods, with adjustments for differences in the number of 
parameters, and for a given significance level (Pollak and Wales 1991; Grewal, Lilien, and 
Mallapragada 2006). The criterion involves a fictitious experiment where two competing 
hypothesis are nested in a composite and the concept of dominance ordering is used to 
choose among the two. This criterion is the one we use for testing hypothesis to choose 
between our non-nested models. 
 Let H1 and H2 be two models (hypotheses) with n1 and n2 parameters, respectively, 
and let L1 and L2 be the log likelihoods. Let 5" denote a critical value of the chi-square 
distribution with " degrees of freedom at significance level X. According to the LDC: 
1. Select H1 if L2 − L1 < [C(n2 + 1) − C(n1 + 1)]/2. 
2. Select H2 if L2 − L1 > [C(n2 − n1 + 1) − C(1)]/2. 
3. Otherwise, model selection is indeterminate. 
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When n1 = n2 (our case), the indeterminate region reduces to zero and the criterion reduces to 
a simple comparison of estimated maximum likelihood values (Pollak and Wales 1991). 
 
Data  
Forage yield data are cross-sectional times-series from a long-term experiment conducted by 
the Agricultural Division of The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation (1997-2008) at Red 
River demonstration and research station near Burneyville, in south-central Oklahoma. The 
experiment began in 1979 and was aimed at evaluating the effect of nitrogen fertilization rate 
and harvest timing on the annual rye-ryegrass forage production system, using a randomized 
complete block design. Details of the experimental set up are described in Altom et al. (1996) 
who analyzed the data from 1979 to 1992.  
Our dataset covers 14 years from fall 1993 to spring 2007. Six treatment levels of 
nitrogen (34-0-0) were administered: 0, 100, 150, 200, 300, and 400 pounds per acre per 
year. Treatments were replicated three times for each level of nitrogen. Split applications 
were used. Ammonium nitrate was broadcast and incorporated prior to planting in the fall. 
Spring applications were not incorporated. Fall fertilization was done between September 24 
and October 25. Spring fertilization was between February 20 and March 17. Phosphorous 
was banded with the seed at a rate of 50lbs P2O5/acre every year, Potassium was broadcast 
and incorporated prior to planting at an average rate of 100 lbs K2O/acre. Lime was applied 
to the plots used in the study. 
Forage yields were determined by clipping individual plots that were 12 by 13 ft. 
Plots were clipped multiple times to simulate grazing. Yearly dry matter forage yields were 
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the sum of all clippings for that year. Average annual rye-ryegrass yield response to nitrogen 
fertilization is shown in figure 1. 
 
Estimation  
The models are estimated using NLMIXED procedure in SAS (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). The 
dependent variable is yield, and the independent variable is nitrogen. For the quadratic, 
nonstochastic LRP and nonstochastic Mitscherlich models, the error term and random effects 
enter the equation linearly. In the stochastic LRP and the stochastic Mitscherlich models, the 
two non-intercept random effects enter the equations nonlinearly. The random effects are 
estimated as free correlated parameters, but the error term is independent.  
The NLMIXED procedure fits nonlinear mixed models by maximizing the likelihood 
integrated over the random effects (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). As is common in nonlinear 
optimization, convergence can be difficult and computing the objective function and its 
derivatives can lead to arithmetic overflows (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). The models have no 
closed form and can only be approximated numerically. To achieve convergence, three 
efforts are employed: scaling, varying starting points, and using different optimization 
techniques.  
Pinheiro and Bates (1995) provide evidence that of the several different integrated 
likelihood approximations methods, adaptive Gaussian quadrature is one of the best. We use 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature to approximate the likelihood function integrals and maximize 
the function by the dual quasi-Newton optimization algorithm. Other optimization techniques 
that enabled convergence are the Newton-Raphson method with ridging and the Trust-
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Region Method (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). The quadratic and nonstochastic Mitscherlich 
models converge with less need of scaling and changing starting point values. Estimates 
obtained are then used to determine the optimal level of nitrogen.  
For the stochastic LRP and stochastic Mitscherlich, the estimated parameters are used 
in Monte Carlo integration. The random vector sY, vY ~N\, ]. We use the Cholesky 
decomposition, Ω = ^ ^, where P is a lower triangular matrix. Let Z be a 2x1 vector of 
independent draws, then P_~N\, ]. With sufficient draws, the sample average of the 
function being integrated provides an approximation to the integral (Greene 2008, pp. 576-
583). We use 10,000 draws for our approximation. To obtain the optimal level of N, we use 
the SAS PROC NLP procedure and maximize our objective function (1) using Newton-
Raphson with ridging. 
 
Results and Discussion  
Estimated parameters are reported for the quadratic model in table 1, linear response plateau 
in table 2, and Mitscherlich in table 3. For all models, the mean parameters and variance 
estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level based on Wald t-tests. Covariance 
parameters of the stochastic quadratic model are not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Covariance parameters of the stochastic Mitscherlich and the covariance between the plateau 
and the slope in the stochastic LRP are statistically significant. The likelihood ratio (LR) 
statistic for the stochastic quadratic versus the nonstochastic quadratic model is 170; the LR 
for the stochastic linear response plateau versus the nonstochastic linear response plateau is 
269.4; and the LR for the stochastic Mitscherlich versus the nonstochastic Mitscherlich is 
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262.8. All the LR statistics are greater than the critical chi-square '`aU( value2 at any 
conventional significance level. Stochastic models fit our data better than the alternative non-
stochastic models. 
Based on the LDC (Pollak and Wales, 1991), we choose the functional form that fits 
our data best. The estimated maximum likelihood value for the stochastic LRP is 2295.1. The 
likelihood value for the stochastic quadratic is 2348.6, and for the stochastic Mitscherlich it is 
2300.0. Both models have the same number of parameters (n=9). Hypothesis testing on 
model functional form according to the LDC ranking favors the stochastic LRP over the 
stochastic Mitscherlich and the stochastic Mitscherlich over the stochastic quadratic model. 
From the illustration in figure 1, a quadratic model may be considered a poor choice for this 
dataset on the basis that it assumes symmetry. It indicates that yield decreases past the peak 
at the same rate it increases before the peak. We base our optimal N rate recommendations 
on the stochastic LRP, the best fitting model.  
Profit maximizing level of nitrogen is evaluated at 2009 input and output prices. 
Although nitrogen 34-0-0 ammonium nitrate was used in the experiment, The Samuel 
Roberts Noble Foundation Agricultural Division currently recommends using 46-0-0 urea. 
The prices of nitrogen 34-0-0 and 46-0-0 as reported by input suppliers in south-central 
Oklahoma are $.51/lb of N and $.41/lb of N, respectively. We do a sensitivity analysis by 
determining nitrogen rate recommendations as nitrogen prices vary. The per pound price of 
forage is determined as the cost of beef gain per pound divided by the pounds of forage 
                                                          
2
 Note that there is a potential nuisance parameter problem with this hypothesis test since imposing 
that the two variances are zero also imposes that the three covariances are zero. We do not explore 
this issue since all null hypotheses are rejected even using the more conservative critical value. 
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required by a stocker animal to produce a one-pound gain (Coulibaly et al., 1996; Kaitibie et 
al., 2003; Belasco et al., 2009). Based on the National Research Council (1984) net energy 
equations used to estimate livestock requirements, Ishrat , Epplin, and Krenzer (2003) and 
Krenzer et al (1996), show that one pound of beef gain requires 10 lbs (dry matter) of 
standing forage. Within the south-central Great Plains, the cost per pound of gain has ranged 
from $0.32/lb since 2005 to $0.55/lb in 2009 (The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Inc. 
2009). Kaitibie et al. (2003) used an average daily weight gain equation and determined the 
cost of beef gain at $0.54/lb. Due to decreased prices of corn and fertilizer, this cost declined 
to $.45/lb, (which is approximately the mean across the period). Therefore, at the cost of beef 
gain per pound of $0.45, the price per pound of forage is $0.45/10=$0.045. Our optimal 
nitrogen rate recommendations are based on nitrogen prices of $0.41/lb and forage sale prices 
of $0.045/lb.  
The estimated optimal nitrogen rates and their standard errors for the models are 
included in the respective tables of results. At the assumed prices, the profit maximizing level 
of nitrogen obtained with the nonstochastic linear response plateau model is 182.3 lbs/acre, 
the level of nitrogen required to reach the plateau. Applied nitrogen increases yield at a rate 
of 13.8 lbs/acre until the plateau yield level of 8235.7 lbs/acre. At $0.045 sale price of forage, 
the marginal value product of nitrogen is $ 0.62 per pound, which is greater than the $ 0.41/lb 
price of nitrogen. The 95% confidence interval of the optimal level of nitrogen obtained with 
the nonstochastic LRP is 209.4 lbs/acre to 154.6 lbs/acre.  
Maximum profits for the stochastic linear response plateau are achieved with nitrogen 
fertilization rate of 143.6 lbs/acre. The 95% confidence interval for this estimate is to apply 
115.5 lbs/acre to 171.8lbs/acre of nitrogen. The nonstochastic LRP gives an optimal level of 
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nitrogen that is 38.7 lbs/acre higher than the stochastic LRP. Based on the average expected 
plateau yield and optimal N obtained with the stochastic LRP, the marginal productivity of 
nitrogen is higher with the stochastic model. On average, nitrogen increases forage yield at a 
rate of 16.3 lbs/acre compared to 13.8 lbs/acre for the nonstochastic model. The stochastic 
LRP function leads to diminishing marginal productivity of nitrogen that is supported by data 
from agronomic experiments (Paris, 1992). The expected profit function of the nonstochastic 
LRP is higher than that of the stochastic LRP (Figure 2a). Figure 2a shows that the expected 
profit curve predicted by the nonstochastic LRP increases linearly as a function of N, and 
decreases sharply when N exceeds the optimal N level. Because of the initial linear section, 
the profit maximizing N rate is insensitive to N prices. The deterministic LRP function 
overestimates yield potential in years when growing conditions are not good. This explains 
the large difference between N recommendations calculated using the stochastic model and 
nonstochastic LRP. The loss (to the producer) from using the nonstochastic LRP to predict 
optimal nitrogen levels when the stochastic LRP is the true model is approximately $9.0 per 
acre. This loss is small because the expected profit function of the stochastic LRP is 
relatively flat. If the prices of N increase relative to the price of forage, the cost of using a 
nonstochastic model to determine N recommendations increases.  
Profit maximizing level of nitrogen obtained with a non-stochastic Mitscherlich is 
113.5 lbs/acre. The 95% confidence interval for this estimate is 95.4 lbs/acre to 130.4 
lbs/acre of nitrogen. The optimal level of nitrogen obtained with a stochastic Mitscherlich 
model is 107.4 lbs/acre. The 95% confidence interval for the optimal level of nitrogen 
obtained with the stochastic Mitscherliuch is 103 lbs/acre to 110.6 lbs/acre. The expected 
profit function of the non-stochastic Mitscherlich model is higher than that of the stochastic 
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Mitscherlich (Figure 2b). The loss from using the nonstochastic Mitscherlich model to 
predict the optimal level of nitrogen when the stochastic Mitscherlich is the true model is 
approximately $1.0 per acre. The economic benefits of using fully stochastic models are 
small since optimal nitrogen rates do not differ greatly between stochastic and nonstochastic 
models and the expected profit functions are relatively flat.  
The analysis presented above does not account for the environmental/social costs of 
over fertilization due to using a nonstochastic model to determine N rates. While not 
quantified, there are additional costs to over estimating crop nitrogen needs. For instance, 
Tumusiime et al. (2011) has shown that applying N above the consumptive potential of the 
growing plant can increase lime costs. There is a potential social cost due to potential 
groundwater contamination from nitrogen fertilizer over application. Since the stochastic 
models recommend lower nitrogen levels; accounting for these additional costs would 
increase the advantage of the stochastic models. 
Profit maximizing level of nitrogen obtained with a nonstochastic quadratic model is 
144.3 lbs/acre, and the optimal level of nitrogen obtained with a stochastic quadratic model is 
171.4 lbs/acre. We notice from figure 3 that fertilizer recommendations for the stochastic 
linear response plateau and the stochastic Mitscherlich can be less or more than fertilization 
rates recommended with the alternative nonstochastic model, depending on price ratios of the 
input and the output. The use of the stochastic LRP or Mitscherlich function to determine N 
recommendations provides insight as to why some farmers may apply more or less nitrogen 
than would appear optimal. Also, the expected profit function is relatively flat so the optimal 
level is likely difficult for farmers to determine. The stochastic quadratic model consistently 
estimates higher optimal levels of nitrogen than the alternative nonstochastic model.  
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Summary and Conclusions 
Models predicting crop yield response to nitrogen fertilizer are often used to recommend 
optimal fertilizer rates. Past studies usually assume the parameters of the yield function are 
nonstochastic or ‘limited’ stochastic, and that all model errors are independent. Given that 
research suggests that the parameters of the yield functions vary by year, estimating a 
random parameter model could give a more realistic model of producers’ profit expectations. 
In this study, we consider yield functions where all parameters are random. The approach 
was applied to cereal rye/ryegrass forage data collected from a long-term nitrogen 
fertilization experiment in south-central Oklahoma to determine and compare the profitability 
of nitrogen estimated from stochastic models and the alternative nonstochastic models. The 
model functional forms considered are the linear response plateau, the quadratic, and the 
Spillman-Mitscherlich.  
Constant parameter models are rejected in favor of random parameter models. 
Quadratic models fit the data poorly. The stochastic LRP provided the best fit to the data 
among the yield functions studied. Our results support the findings of Tembo et al. (2008), 
and Kaitibie et al. (2003) that LRP with stochastic plateau provide a better fit than a 
deterministic plateau function. The value of using a stochastic LRP instead of a deterministic 
model was estimated to be $9/acre so the economic benefit is not huge. The finding by 
Makowski and Wallach (2002) that it pays to use a random parameter model to calculate 
nitrogen rates is supported but the loss from not using random parameter models to determine 
the optimal level of nitrogen is small since optimal nitrogen rates do not differ greatly 
between stochastic and nonstochastic models and the expected profit function is relatively 
flat. Another implication of this study regarding the flatness of the profit function is that it 
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brings into question the economic feasibility of variable rate application technologies that are 
being developed to improve nitrogen use efficiency. If forage producers have a wide margin 
of error when deciding how much nitrogen to apply, the cost of obtaining a more accurate 
estimate of N may not exceed the benefit since the cost of ‘being roughly right’ in N rate is 
not large.  
The observation by Cerrato and Blackmer (1990) and other researchers that the 
quadratic model estimates a higher optimal nitrogen rate than a linear response plateau is 
supported for stochastic models but not for nonstochastic models. The quadratic model 
implies a yield decline beyond the maximum yield due to excess nitrogen fertilization, which 
is rarely observed in field studies. Nevertheless, our data do show an unsustained yield 
decline at a high nitrogen rate. Other studies do find a quadratic model providing a better 
statistical fit (Belanger et al. 2000) which means yield functions with plateau may not 
dominate in every situation. In a practical farm extension context, stochastic production 
functions provide a way of incorporating production uncertainty into input decisions. The 
methodology developed to determine N recommendations is applicable to other crops as well 
as other areas. The methodology is of benefit to producers as it improves the precision of 
optimal N recommendations under production uncertainty as well as improving nitrogen use 
efficiency, and farm profitability. 
Current recommendations of fertilizing annual cool season cereal rye-ryegrass 
pastures from the Noble Foundation are to apply 100 to 200 lbs/acre. Our estimated optimal 
rates are within this range. Based on the estimates from the stochastic LRP, the 95% 
confidence interval level is to apply between 115.5 lbs/acre to 171.8lbs/acre annually.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Rye-Ryegrass Yield (1000lbs/acre) Response to Nitrogen (100lbs/acre) Using 
the Nonstochastic and Stochastic Quadratic Models 
Parameter 
Stochastic 
Quadratic 
Nonstochastic 
Quadratic 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Intercept  
 
5.74 0.54 5.77 1.15 
Slope ( 1.74 0.44 1.64 0.18 
Quadratic term (U -0.24 0.10 -0.25 0.04 
Variance of intercept random effect (bcU 13.46 3.29 19.32 7.08 
Variance of error term (bdU 1.89 0.11 2.43 0.14 
Variance of slope random effect (beU 1.93 0.35   
Variance of quadratic term random 
effect (bfU 0.47 0.20   
Covariance bcU, bfU 1.62 1.51   
Covariance bfU, beU -0.004 0.38   
Covariance bcU, beU -0.03 0.06   
Optimal level of N (100lbs/acre) 1.71 0.12 1.44 0.15 
-2 Log Likelihood  2348.6  2433.6  
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Table 2. Rye-Ryegrass Yield (1000lbs/acre) Response to Nitrogen Using the 
Nonstochastic and Stochastic Linear Response Plateau Models 
Parameter 
Stochastic Linear 
Plateau 
Nonstochastic Linear 
Plateau 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Intercept  5.67 0.29 5.72 1.15 
Slope  1.62 0.31 1.38 0.17 
Yield plateau  ! 8.01 0.12 8.23 1.14 
Intercept random effect bcU 13.96 1.53 19.32 7.08 
Variance of error term bdU 1.85 0.11 2.42 0.14 
Plateau random effect beU 3.65 0.33   
Variance of slope random effect bfU 0.89 0.16   
Covariance bcU, bfU -1.41 0.74   
Covariance bcU, beU 0.89 0.82   
Covariance bfU, beU 1.54 0.18   
Optimal level of N (100lbs/acre) 1.44 0.14a 1.82 0.14a 
-2 Log Likelihood  2295.10  2429.80  
a
 The standard error of N* for the stochastic LRP is obtained by Monte Carlo methods, while 
the standard error of N* for the nonstochastic LRP is obtained using the delta rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 3. Rye-Ryegrass Yield (1000lbs/acre) Response to Nitrogen Using the 
Nonstochastic and Stochastic Spillman-Mitscherlich Models 
Parameter 
Stochastic 
Mitscherlich 
Nonstochastic 
Mitscherlich 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Maximum (potential) yield E  
 
7.91 0.12 
 
8.47 1.15 
Response due to nitrogen F 3.28 0.38 2.81 0.23 
Ratio of successive increments H 1.31 0.26 0.89 0.16 
Variance of error term $	 1.85 0.11 2.42 0.14 
Intercept random effect bcU  19.44 1.10 19.35 7.09 
Variance of slope random effect bfU 5.89 1.45   
Plateau random effect beU 0.37 0.15   
Covariance bcU, bfU 8.36 1.16   
Covariance bfU, beU 1.67 0.36   
Covariance bcU, beU 0.80 0.19   
Optimal level of N (100lbs/acre) 1.07 0.02b 1.13 0.09b 
-2 Log Likelihood  2300.0  2431.4  
bThe standard error of N* for the stochastic Mitscherlich is obtained by Monte Carlo 
methods, while the standard error of N* for the nonstochastic Mitscherlich is obtained using 
the delta rule 
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Figure 1. Ryegrass yield response to applied nitrogen 
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(a)                                                                             (b) 
Figure 2. Expected profit functions (Price of ryegrass =$.0450/lb, price of 
nitrogen=$.41/lb) 
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Figure 3. Optimal level of N at varying prices for the LRP models and Mitscherlich 
models (price of ryegrass is constant at $ 0.045) 
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ESSAY II 
 
 
HOW MUCH DOES CONSIDERING THE COST OF LIME AFFECT THE RECOMMENDED 
LEVEL OF NITROGEN3 
Abstract 
Ammonium based nitrogen fertilizers acidify soils. Lime used to correct soil pH is a 
substantial cost to producers. Recommendations about the optimal levels of nitrogen to 
apply typically ignore the cost of lime needed due to nitrogen fertilization acidification. 
This study aimed to determine the effect of considering the cost of lime on 
recommendations about the optimal level of nitrogen. Yield response and soil pH change 
functions were estimated and used to determine the optimal levels of nitrogen and lime. 
The study also developed a new version of a linear response plateau function that allows 
the yield plateau to vary by year with respect to nitrogen but not soil pH. The stochastic 
linear response plateau fit the data best. At current input and output prices, considering 
the cost of lime reduced the optimal level of nitrogen by as much as 11.3% from 168 to 
149 kg ha-1 yr-1. Acidification potential due to N fertilizer increased nonlinearly as N rate 
increased. Nitrogen acidification appears to be more severe with N application rates 
above consumptive potential of the crop than with N that is used by the plant. Timing of 
N application had no significant effect on forage yield, but splitting N into fall and spring 
applications significantly reduced acidification due to excess N fertilization. 
Recommendations of how much N to apply were 149 kg ha-1 yr-1 with pH at least 5.88. 
                                                          
3
 This paper was published in the Agronomy journal. It is included in this dissertation as it appears in 
Agronomy Journal 103:404-412.  
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Introduction  
Using ammonium based nitrogen (N) fertilizers in crop production has been shown to 
acidify soils (Mahler and Harder, 1984; Pierre et al., 1971). Acidification due to N 
fertilization results from three major factors. One is the removal of base cations such as 
calcium and magnesium through crop harvest. Nitrogen fertilizers increase yields and 
thus increase the removal of bases in the harvested crop. The second effect comes from 
nitrates that are not taken up by the growing crop. Nitrates are very soluble and, if not 
taken up by plants, leach to deeper soil layers taking with them base elements like 
calcium and magnesium (Mahler and Harder, 1984). The other is microbial oxidation of 
ammoniacal fertilizers (nitrification), a process that releases hydrogen ions (H+) into the 
soil (Adams 1984). Acidity from nitrification is, however, partly or wholly countered by 
the alkalinity produced during the uptake and assimilation of nitrate N to its organic form 
(Bolan et al., 1991; Bouman et al., 1995). 
Historically, soil acidity has not been a problem for most croplands in the 
southern Great Plains of the USA (Shorey, 1940). However, in the past decades, soil pH 
values have declined due to continuous cropping and long-term use of large amounts of 
ammonium-based N fertilizers (Zhang and Raun, 2006). A survey in 1985 supported by 
the Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Service of wheat fields cropped continuously 
showed more than 30% of 17,000 soil samples analyzed had pH levels less than 5.5. In 
1995, a similar survey of 3,709 samples showed that 39% of the samples had pH levels 
less than 5.5 (Zhang et al., 1998). These surveys suggest that soil pH levels in fields 
under continuous cultivation in the region have declined to levels that Zhang and Raun, 
(2006) argue to be yield limiting, and that the problem has increased over time.  
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Associated with very acidic soils are problems that limit crop and pasture growth 
and yield. Plant utilization of many nutrients becomes less efficient as soil acidity 
increases (Haynes and Ludecke, 1981; Black, 1993). Detrimental effects from soil acidity 
vary with crop, rooting depth, and crop tolerance (Black, 1993). The most serious 
problems are due to aluminum and manganese toxicities that increase as soil pH drops 
below 5.0. Aluminum toxicity restricts the development of crop root systems, which in 
turn reduces nutrient uptake. Manganese toxicity results in deficiencies of the essential 
mineral nutrients calcium, phosphorous, and molybdenum (Black, 1993). 
Acidic soils can be amended by liming. Benefits of liming include improved N 
fixation and availability of the essential nutrients calcium, phosphorous, and 
molybdenum and decreased solubility of toxic elements aluminum and manganese 
(Haynes and Ludecke, 1981). The per unit cost of lime is low relative to other fertilizers, 
but lime application rates are significantly higher than rates for fertilizers such as N and 
phosphorous. Because large amounts of neutralizing material are often needed, liming can 
be expensive. Recommendations about how much N to apply typically ignore the cost of 
lime due to N fertilization. Ignoring the cost of lime may lead to higher than optimal N 
recommendations.  
Past literature on crop yield response to N fertilizer has often favored a linear 
response and plateau model (Paris, 1992; Ackello-Ogutu et al., 1985). With this response 
function, the optimal level of the input does not matter over a wide range of input prices 
because it ignores production uncertainty. Recent empirical research however, has shown 
that the plateau yield varies across years (Tembo et al., 2008; Makowski and Wallach, 
2002). Tembo et al. (2008) and Tumusiime et al. (2010) showed that with a variable 
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plateau model, the producer’s expected profit function is relatively flat near the optimum 
N level. The relative flatness of the profit function near the optimum input level means 
that considering the cost of liming could change recommended N levels. Further, 
precision sensing systems to improve N use efficiency have been shown to be marginal in 
terms of economics (Lambert et al., 2006; Biermacher et al., 2009). A large enough cost 
of liming could make precision sensing systems more competitive economically.  
Forage rye-ryegrass responds well to high N fertilizer levels and performs well in 
soils with pH values ranging from 5.5 (Zhang and Raun, 2006) to 8 (Barnes et al., 2003). 
The problem of soil acidity is likely greater on croplands under forage production than on 
those under grain production since grains contain less basic materials than stems or 
leaves. Moreover, forage harvested by grazing or by baling is removed from the place of 
production, meaning base elements are not released back to the soil. Considering the cost 
of lime is expected to lower recommended levels of N.  
Of interest is whether or not excess N that is not used by the plant leads to a 
greater reduction in soil pH than does N that is used by the plant to produce forage. If this 
effect turns out to be large, then the study would have favorable implications on the 
economic competitiveness of precision sensing systems. This research will also benefit 
producers by giving much more precise estimates of optimal soil pH and N fertilization 
strategies that may be useful in improving fertilizer use efficiency and increasing farm 
net returns.  
The objective of this study is to determine the effect of considering the cost of 
lime on recommendations about the optimal level of N to apply. To achieve this 
objective, the study determines the effect of N fertilization rate, N fertilization timing and 
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lime application on soil pH change; and the effect of soil pH, and N fertilization rate and 
timing on forage yield. Data are from a long-term N fertilization and liming experiment 
in south-central Oklahoma, USA that provides annual rye-ryegrass (Lolium multiflorum) 
forage yields and soil pH levels.  
 
Materials and Methods  
a) Data 
A long-term experiment was conducted at the Red River Research and Demonstration 
Farm near Burneyville, Oklahoma by The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation’s 
Agricultural Division. The experiment started in 1979 and its aim was to establish the 
effect of liming, N fertilization rate and timing on forage yields of a mixture of rye 
(Secale cereal) and ryegrass (Lolium multiflorum) as well as soil pH dynamics. The effect 
of N fertilization rates on forage yield and quality was analyzed by Altom et al. (1996) 
using data from 1979 to 1992. The data set for this project is for rye-ryegrass pasture for 
the period from fall 1993 to spring 2007.  
The soil at the site is Minco fine sandy loam (coarse-silty, mixed, superactive, 
thermic Udic Haplustolls). Since 1993, rye-ryegrass has been planted in early fall at a 
seeding rate of 22 kg ha-1. A split-plot randomized complete block design with three 
replications was used. Six treatment levels of N were administered: 0, 112, 168, 224, 336 
and 448 kg N ha-1 yr-1. Nitrogen fertilizer applied as ammonium nitrate (34-0-0) was 
applied in a single application (all applied pre planting in fall, or all applied in spring) 
and in two split applications: fall and spring. Nitrogen fertilizer was broadcast and 
incorporated prior to planting in the fall. Ammonium nitrate applied in the spring was 
broadcast. Phosphorous applied as diammonium phosphate (18-46-0) was banded with 
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the seed at a rate of 24 kg P ha-1. Potassium as potassium chloride KCl, (0-0-60) was 
broadcast and incorporated prior to planting at an average rate of 93 kg K ha-1. 
Lime (dolomitic) was applied in 1979, 1996, 1998, and 2004. In 1979, lime was 
applied at a rate of 4483 kg ha-1. Over time, the soil acidified. Experimental plots were 
limed to raise the soil pH to 6.0-6.5. In 1996, 5604 kg ha-1 of effective calcium carbonate 
equivalent (ECCE) was added to all plots on the east half (split plot). In 1998, lime was 
applied again to the east half of the split plots, but was varied with N rates as follows: to 
plots that had not been fertilized with N, no extra lime was added; to plots that had 
received 112 kg and 168 kg of N, 2242 kg ha-1 of ECCE was added; while plots that had 
been fertilized at a rate of 224 kg, 336 kg, and 448 kg ha-1 of N, 3362 kg, 4483 kg, and 
5604 kg ha-1 respectively of ECCE was added. In 2004, lime was applied at a rate of 2242 
kg ha-1 to all of the east side plots.  
Top soil pH was measured twice every season: at the start and at the end of the 
season. The pH value used is the average of the two measurements. Soil pH was 
determined in a 1:2 soil/water suspension. The pH reading was then taken using a glass 
electrode on a pH meter. Observations of soil pH in 1994 and 2003 were missing from 
the dataset. They were estimated as an average of the previous and subsequent year 
observations measured on the same plot. Forage yields were determined by clipping from 
individual plots that were 3.6 by 4 meters. Plots were clipped multiple times to simulate 
grazing. Yearly dry matter forage yields were the sum of all clippings for that year. 
Additional information regarding the experiment can be found in Altom et al. (1996). A 
total of 1261 observations were collected from the experiment; 270 of which were 
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observations for fall N application, 449 for spring N application and 542 for split N 
application.  
 
b). Theoretical Models 
(I) Rye-ryegrass response to  lime and nitrogen  
Crop response to lime is principally a response to pH and the related secondary benefits 
(Haynes and Ludecke, 1981). In this study, rye-ryegrass yield response is represented as a 
function of soil pH and applied N. Agronomic studies suggest that crop response to a 
factor is observed when the input is limiting. That is, crops will respond to lime 
applications only if pH levels are limiting crop performance. This physiological concept 
is described by the limiting linear response plateau (LRP) model (Ackello-Ogutu et al., 
1985; Paris, 1992). For yield response to soil pH, Adams (1984) observed that the 
function should exhibit decreasing marginal return to lime and/or that the plateau yield 
should begin somewhere below pH 7. These characteristics are exhibited by the quadratic 
and linear response plateau functions. 
Mahler and McDole (1987) addressed a similar issue. They used 5 years of data 
and fit quadratic and linear plateau models consisting of intersecting straight lines for 
wheat, barley, pea, and lentil yield response to artificially acidified soils in northern 
Idaho. They described the knot point of the linear response and plateau model as the 
minimum soil pH required to reach the plateau yield. Their findings showed that the LRP 
model provided a better representation of data than the quadratic model. Lukin and 
Epplin (2003) used 4 years of wheat yield data obtained from a lime rate experiment in 
Oklahoma. They fit linear response plateau, quadratic and quadratic plateau models and 
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found that plateau functions produced soil pH estimates that were more rational from the 
agronomic point of view.  
A linear response plateau (LRP) function and a quadratic function are considered 
in this study. Following Tembo et al., (2008), the hypotheses on whether the plateau yield 
of the LRP is stochastic or deterministic was tested. A non-stochastic linear response 
plateau model involving N and pH with N timing variables is specified as 
(1)               ittititiiit uPpHNSpringSplity εγγββββ ++++++= ),,)(min( 103210
,
 
where ity is the forage yield from the i
th
 plot in year t, Nit is the level of N fertilizer, pHit 
is the pH level, iSplit is a split N application dummy variable ( 1=iSplit if N was applied 
in two splits: fall and spring, zero otherwise), iSpring is a spring application dummy 
variable ( 1=iSpring if all N was applied in spring, zero otherwise), Pit is expected 
plateau yield, tu  is the (intercept) year random effect, and itε is a random error term. The 
parameters 0β  and 0γ , are responses at the origin, 1β  is a linear slope parameter of N 
application, and 1γ
 
is a linear slope parameter of soil pH. The random parameters tu  and 
itε are normally distributed and uncorrelated. Equation (1) suggests that at the plateau 
yield Pit, the factors N and pH are no longer limiting and do not affect crop yield (Paris, 
1992).  
The assumption behind the non-stochastic LRP is that all factors that define 
plateau yield are fixed and completely controllable. With the stochastic linear response 
plateau model of Tembo et al. (2008), the plateau itself becomes a random variable that 
varies by year depending on growing conditions. The effect of soil pH is not expected to 
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be affected by growing conditions in a given year. That is, the plateau yield is stochastic 
with respect to N but not with respect to soil pH. When growing conditions are favorable 
in a given year, the plateau yield increases as does the amount of N that the plant can use. 
Under this consideration, we specify a new version of a stochastic LRP model as 
 (2)   
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where the first bracket parameters define a deterministic plateau for soil pH, and the 
second bracket defines forage yield response to N with a stochastic plateau. The 
parameter tv  is the plateau year random effect. The random parameters tv , tu  and itε are 
normally distributed and uncorrelated. Unlike the model by Tembo et al. (2008), equation 
(1) is not nested in (2).  
       A quadratic response model is also estimated4: 
   (3)   
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where
 
0α  is the response parameter at the origin, 1α and 3α  are slope parameters, 2α  and 
4α  are quadratic parameters, 5α and 6α  are N timing slope dummy variables, tu is year 
random effect, and itε the random error term.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 An interaction term between nitrogen and soil pH was not included (even though it was 
statistically significant) because doing so yielded an estimated model that was not concave with 
the second order derivative conditions for net return maximization not holding so that the optimal 
solution would be infinite N and infinite pH. 
 
44 
 
(II) Soil pH change model  
Soil pH change is a complex phenomenon dependent on both site and management 
factors. According to Black (1993) and Mahler and Harder (1984), change in soil pH over 
time is a function of crop uptake, N acidification, leaching, and the soil’s buffering 
capacity. Gasser (1973) showed that the rate of pH change varies with initial soil pH. 
Empirical models estimated by Goulding et al. (1989) also showed that the magnitude 
and duration of the effect of lime varies by initial soil pH, fertilizer additions, and crop 
grown.  
Soil pH change was modeled as a function of N fertilizer inputs, lime, initial soil 
pH, and a time trend5. For a multiple application model, the total effect of lime and N 
applications accumulates the effects of all previous applications. The cumulative effect of 
lime and N applications on soil pH change over T years is represented as: 
(4)  
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where itpH∆ is the difference between pH at time t ( tpH ) in the ith plot and 0pH at the 
start of the experiment in 1993, LRt is the lime rate in year t, T is the time trend variable 
(T=1,…,14), ut is year random effect, Si is plot random effect included to account for 
potential measurement errors in initial pH ( 0pH ), and itε  is the random error term. 
Equation (4) is dynamic, with initial soil pH included. The sum of the square of N is 
                                                          
5
 Forage yield was not included in the estimated model as an independent variable because it 
proved to be highly collinear with N and insignificant.  
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included as an independent variable to capture the possible effect of excess N fertilization 
on soil pH. The interaction between N squared term and seasonal N application dummy 
variables are included to account for the effect of N timing on soil acidification due to 
excess N (slope dummies for the linear term were not statistically significant). 
(III) Quantity of lime required to neutralize the acidifying effect of nitrogen  
The acidifying effect of N fertilizer is estimated in equation (4). The quantities of lime 
required to neutralize this acidity can be calculated. Most soil testing laboratories use a 
special buffered solution to measure exchangeable acidity. By calibrating pH changes in 
the buffered solution with known amounts of acid, the amount of lime required to bring 
the soil to a particular pH can be determined. 
 Pierre et al. (1971) and Gasser (1973) showed that the theoretical requirement of 
lime required to neutralize the acidity produced from fertilizer N inputs is 3.6 kg calcium 
carbonate for 1 kg N applied as ammonium nitrate, and 7. 2 kg calcium carbonate for 1 
kg N applied as ammonium sulphate. Archer’s (1985) study of forage grasses, found that 
200-300 kg of calcium carbonate are required to neutralize the acidifying effect of 100 kg 
N applied as ammonium nitrate or urea, and 500- 700 kg of calcium carbonate if N 
fertilizer is applied as ammonium sulphate.  
The actual lime needed to neutralize acidity from N fertilizer inputs is likely less 
than the theoretical requirement because some ammonium and nitrate are lost by other 
processes such as volatilization, denitrification, and microbial fixation (Chambers and 
Garwood, 1998). In this study, the acidity from N fertilizer is measured by determining 
the quantity of lime required to neutralize this acidity. To simplify the derivation, we 
assume all N was applied in the fall, but the same approach can be extended to the case 
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where all N was applied in the spring and split (spring and fall) applications.  Abstracting 
from (4), at constant soil pH:  
                    (5)                        .02321 =++ NNL ηηη  
The quantity of lime )(L required to neutralize acidity from a given amount of N fertilizer 
is then calculated as: 
                (6)           ./][ 1232 ηηη NNL +=
 
This quantity of agricultural lime is the amount required to offset acidity produced by 
application of N fertilizer. When (6) is evaluated at the optimum N level, the quantity of 
lime required to keep soil pH constant is obtained6.  
From (6), the marginal effect of N on the amount of lime required is:  
                (7)           ( )[ ]./2 132 ηηη NNL +=∂∂
 
The cost of liming due to N fertilization is obtained by multiplying (7) by the unit cost of 
liming. This economic consideration suggests that for every kg of N fertilizer applied, a 
cost is incurred by the producer in liming to offset the acidity created. 
 
(c)    Economic evaluation  
The producer’s expected net return (NR) maximization is defined as  
(8) NNwpHNyEpNRE yN )()],([][max −=  
             s.t. *pHpH = , and ln pNrNw ]/)2[()( 132 ηηη ++=
,
 
                                                          
6
 Lukin and Epplin (2002) determined the optimal level of lime and liming frequency using dynamic 
programming (DP). A DP model was estimated, but application timing varies considerably depending on 
initial pH, and such results would be more difficult to communicate. The long run effect from DP, however, 
is not substantially different from the results reported in this study.  
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where yp is the price of forage, lp is the unit cost of lime, pH* is the optimal pH level, 
and )(Nw is the cost of N which is split into the unit buy price of N ( nr ) and the cost of 
liming due to N acidification defined from (7) as lpN ]/)2[( 132 ηηη + . To determine the 
effect of considering the cost of lime on recommendations about the optimal level of N, 
(8) is evaluated when nrNw =)( (ignoring the cost of liming) and when 
.]/)2[()( 132 ln pNrNw ηηη ++=   
Yield expectation in (8) is obtained by taking the expectation of the production 
function ).,( pHNy  For the quadratic yield function, a solution to (8) is obtained by 
marginal analysis since (3) is continuously differentiable. With the non-stochastic LRP, 
the function is continuous, but its derivatives do not exist with respect to either its 
parameters or the inputs (N and pH) at the knot point where the response and the plateau 
are joined. Optimal level of N )( *N will be at the knot point or at zero. Thus, yield 
maximizing and net revenue maximizing level of N are the same except in the case where 
the value marginal product of N is less than the marginal factor cost of N. Considering 
the case where all N was applied in fall and assuming zero is not optimal, the optimal 
level of N with a non-stochastic LRP is ,/)( 10* ββ−= PN and enough lime needs to be 
applied to reach the optimal pH of ./)( 10* γγ−= PpH   
For the stochastic LRP, the random variable tv is nonlinear in the yield function 
(2), and therefore does not drop out after taking expectation as does the variable tu . The 
expectation of ),( pHNy in (8) becomes  
  (9) 
                  
)].,min()1,[min(][ 1010 vPNpHEyE +++= ββγγ
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Optimal soil pH is ./)1( 10* γγ−=pH  Note that at *pH , the term )1,min( 10 pHγγ + equals 
one such that (9) reduces to  
              (10)                    )].,[min(][ 10 vPNEyE ++= ββ  
The expectation in (10) defines an integral with respect to v
 
that must be solved 
numerically to obtain *N . The approach developed by Tembo et al. (2008) was used to 
solve the integral, and involves evaluating a univariate normal probability density, and 
obtaining *N by marginal analysis. Tembo et al. (2008) showed that the expectation in 
(10) becomes 
 (11) 
                    
)]/())(1[(][ 10 FfPFNFyE vσββ −++−=
 
where F is the normal cumulative distribution with the argument N10 ββ + , mean P , and 
variance ;v f is the probability density function (pdf) of F , and vσ is the standard 
deviation of .v The term )1( F− in (11) is the probability of being above the plateau, and 
the term )/( FfPF vt σ− is the contribution to the expected value when below the mean 
plateau yield. 
 Substituting (11) into (8), the expected net return function becomes 
            (12) 
    
.)()]/())(1[(][ 10 LpNNwFfPFNFpNRE lvy −−−++−= σββ
 
The function defined in (12) is concave with respect to N. By differentiating7 (12) with 
respect to N and setting the derivative equal to zero, *N is obtained:  
          (13)         ]./)(1([1 110
1
* βσβ
β
yvt pNwGPN −+−=
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7
 By the chain rule, the first derivative of (12) with respect to N is equal to 
,0)()1(1 =−− NwFp yβ  and the second derivative 0/21 <− vy fp σβ is satisfied.  
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The term )/)(1( 11 βypNwG −− is the inverse standard normal cumulative distribution, 
which is approximated using Z statistical tables or statistical software. When ,)( nrNw = a 
consistent estimate of *N is obtained directly in (13) by substituting the parameters 
,,, 10 Pββ and vσ  by their estimated values, and the input and output prices by their 
market values. When ln pNrNw ]/)[()( 132 ηηη ++= , *N is found numerically by a 
graphical grid search.  
The profit function in (8) is evaluated using 2010 input and output prices. Input prices 
for N and lime were taken from fertilizer suppliers located in south-central Oklahoma. 
The price of N is $0.99 kg-1, and the cost of liming, including application, is 
approximately $.035 kg-1 of 100% ECCE. The price of forage is determined as the cost of 
beef gain per kilogram divided by the kilograms of forage required by a stocker animal to 
produce a 1-kg gain. Based on the National Research Council (1984), net energy 
equations used to estimate livestock requirements, Ishrat, et al. (2003) and Krenzer et al. 
(1996), showed that 1 kg of beef gain requires 10 kg (dry matter) of standing forage. In 
the southern plains, the cost per kg of gain has ranged from $0.71 kg-1 since 2005 to 
$1.21 kg-1 in 2010, which is approximately $0.96 kg-1 gain on average. At the cost of beef 
gain per kg of $0.96, the price per kg of forage is $0.96/10=$0.096.  
 
(d) Estimation of models  
The three models (1)-(3) of rye-ryegrass yield response to N and soil pH were estimated 
using the SAS NLMIXED procedure (SAS Institute Inc., 2003) which maximizes the 
marginal log-likelihood function. The random error term and intercept year random effect 
enter the equations linearly, but the plateau year random effect in the stochastic LRP 
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enters the equation nonlinearly. The marginal log-likelihoods of the models have no 
closed form and can only be approximated numerically. As is common in nonlinear 
optimization, convergence of the models to global maxima is not guaranteed. 
To achieve convergence, three efforts were employed: data scaling, varying 
starting points, and using different optimization techniques available in SAS. Adaptive 
Gaussian quadrature was used to approximate the likelihood function integrals, and the 
function was maximized by the trust region optimization technique. Other optimization 
techniques that enabled convergence were the Newton Raphson method with ridging and 
quasi-Newton (SAS Institute Inc. 2003). The linear regression model of soil pH change 
(equation 4) was estimated using the SAS Mixed procedure using maximum likelihood 
(SAS Institute Inc., 2003).  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Average annual soil pH changes in limed and unlimed plots during the study period are 
shown in figure 1. Figure 1 shows that on limed plots, the magnitude and effect of lime 
application on soil pH varied with initial pH. On plots that received lime, pH increased 
after lime treatments, and then gradually declined over the study period. Soil pH on the 
control treatments (no lime) decreased, but the rate of decrease from year to year was 
slight. Pairwise comparisons based on least significant differences (LSD) showing the 
years in which soil pH change was significant are presented in Table 1. Changes in the 
pH of soil samples from year to year confirm acidification progressed.     
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The relationship between N rate and soil acidification level is shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows that the pH on both limed and unlimed plots decreased with increasing N 
fertilization rate. Pairwise comparisons based on LSD show mean pH in limed plots 
differed significantly (α=0.05) from plots that were not limed for all nitrogen application 
rates (Table 2). Mean pH in limed (not limed) plots that were fertilized with up to 224 kg 
ha-1 of N was not significantly different (α=0.05) from limed (not limed) plots that 
received zero N rate.  
Average rye-ryegrass yield response to N is shown in figure 3, and the 
relationship between soil pH levels and rye-ryegrass forage yields is shown in figure 4. 
Figure 3 suggests that lime treatments influenced forage yield. LSD comparisons (Table 
2), however, indicate yields in lime treated and not treated plots were only significantly 
different (α=0.05) at nitrogen application rates of 224 kg ha-1 and above (Table 2). Data 
presented in figure 4 show increased yield response of rye-ryegrass to soil pH well 
beyond the current recommendation of 5.5. 
 
Results from the regression of rye-ryegrass yield models 
The estimated parameters for the yield functions are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Parameter estimates of N and pH effect on rye-ryegrass yield have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant (P <0.01) based on the Wald t tests. Parameter estimates of 
spring and split applications from the yield regression models are not significant (P < 
0.05) in the quadratic and stochastic LRP. This result suggests that applying all N prior to 
planting rye-ryegrass in the fall yielded similar forage yield as split or spring applications 
of N.  
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To find the yield functional form that fit the data best, the estimated yield models 
were compared using the likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) of Pollak and Wales 
(1991). The LDC provides a rationale to compare two models based on the difference in 
log-likelihood values, with adjustments for differences in the number of parameters, and 
for a given level of significance (Pollak and Wales, 1991). Hypothesis testing according 
to the LDC favors the stochastic LRP model against the non-stochastic LRP model, and 
the non-stochastic LRP is favored against the quadratic model. A graphical representation 
of the dataset in Figure 3 provides further evidence of why a quadratic model fit our data 
poorly. Our conclusions are based on the model that fit the data best, the stochastic LRP. 
Results of optimal N and pH are calculated assuming all N was applied in fall. 
Seasonal N dummy variables shift the slope on N. If we are to consider spring 
application, or split application, the estimated slope on N would shift by the added 
parameter of spring or split application. In our recommendations of optimal N and pH 
from the stochastic linear response plateau model, we do not consider spring or split 
applications since the estimated parameters are not significantly different from zero. 
The estimated soil pH levels ( *pH ) for which expected maximum yield can be 
obtained are different for the models, but within the range of agronomic 
recommendations for forage grasses. As expected, the estimated pH level necessary to 
reach maximum yield was highest with the quadratic model. From estimates of the 
quadratic model, soil pH level of at least 7.19 would be required to obtain maximum 
yield. With the non-stochastic LRP model, a pH level of at least 6.06 would be required 
to obtain plateau yield, while for the stochastic LRP, a pH level of at least 5.88 is 
required to obtain average expected plateau yield.  
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The Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Service currently recommends lime for 
forage production when soil pH is below 5.5 (Zhang and Raun, 2006). Yield maximizing 
soil pH levels obtained in this study suggest higher pH recommendations for rye-ryegrass 
pasture than the current 5.5.  
 
Results from the regression of soil pH change model 
Parameter estimates from the regression of soil pH change model (equation 4) are 
reported in Table 5. All parameter estimates are statistically significant (P < 0.05) except 
the time trend and intercept parameters. The coefficient of the squared term of N is 
negative which means the rate of acidification increases as the level of N increases. The 
coefficient of the interaction of cumulative N2 and spring N application is negative, 
meaning applying all N in spring increased acidification due to excess N fertilization. N 
applied in two splits (spring and fall) reduced soil acidification due to excess N 
fertilization. Presumably, split application reduced the amount of N lost by leaching.  
Equivalent acidity and alkalinity estimates show that 100 kg ha-1 of N fertilizer 
applied as ammonium nitrate (34-0-0) will lower the soil pH by 0.00604 pH units, while 
100 kg ha-1 of 100% ECCE will raise soil pH by 0.0051 pH units in the long run. 
Estimates in Table 5 were used in equation (6) to determine the equivalent quantity of 
agricultural lime (100% ECCE) needed to neutralize acidity produced by applying 
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. From equation (6), if only 1 kg of N fertilizer were applied 
annually as ammonium nitrate (34-0-0), 1.2 kg ha-1 of 100% ECCE would be required to 
neutralize the acidifying effect of N. The negative coefficient on the quadratic term for N 
indicates that proportionally more lime is required for higher levels of N. For example, 
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173.0 kg ha-1 of 100% ECCE is required to neutralize the acidifying effect from 100 kg 
ha-1 of N applied as ammonium nitrate (34-0-0). Model predictions found in this study 
compare well with findings by Adams (1984) and Pierre et al. (1971) who found that soil 
acidification due to N fertilizer is about one half of the theoretical estimate.  
Estimates of the quantity of lime required to neutralize acidity from various levels 
of N are presented in Figure 5. From Figure 5, the quantity of lime required to offset 
acidity from N fertilizer increases nonlinearly as N rate increases. This result suggests 
that N acidification is more severe with N application amounts above the consumptive 
potential of the growing plant. This effect may be due to excess nitrates in the soil 
increasing the potential for leaching. The larger the amount of N fertilizer applied, the 
larger the percentage lost through leaching and the greater the amount of acidity 
developed.  
 Results of this study suggest that minimizing the leaching of −3NO  by timing and 
matching fertilizer rates to crop needs during each growing season might substantially 
reduce acidification due to N fertilization. The cost of liming due to N fertilization was 
estimated to be $6.74 for 100 kg of applied N, but increases nonlinearly as N increases. 
In terms of precision agriculture, saving this cost would be an added benefit in addition to 
the savings in nitrogen fertilizer application or revenues due to yield increase by 
predicting the nitrogen requirements of the crop in-season using precision sensing 
systems. 
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Effect of the cost of lime on nitrogen recommendations and lime requirement  
To determine the effect of the cost of liming on the recommended level of N, the 
expected net return function (equation 8) was solved with, and without, the cost of liming 
due to N fertilization. Optimal levels of N were noted in both cases, and the effect of the 
cost of liming on recommendations of optimal levels of N was determined as the 
difference between the two N levels. Optimal levels of N obtained when the cost of lime 
is considered are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
With the quadratic model, when the cost of liming is considered, the optimal level 
of N reduces from 174.1kg ha-1 to 156 kg ha-1, which is 10.4% less. With the stochastic 
LRP model, the optimal level of N reduces by 11.3% from 168 to 149 kg ha-1 when the 
cost of lime is considered. The estimated *N with estimates of the non-stochastic LRP is 
220 kg ha-1 with or without considering the cost of liming. That is, at current input and 
output prices, even when the cost of liming due to N fertilization is considered, the 
marginal value product (MVP) of N is still greater than the marginal factor cost (MFC) of 
N. Note that with the nonstochastic LRP, optimal N is either zero (if MVP<MFC) or the 
level of N required to obtain plateau yield (if MVP>MFC). This means the cost of liming 
is not large enough to cause MFC>MVP. Current recommendations from the Noble 
Research Foundation are to apply between 112 to 224 kg ha-1. Based on estimates from 
the stochastic LRP, optimal N should be 149 kg ha-1.  
Optimal levels of N obtained with the specific yield model above were used in (6) 
to determine the quantity of lime required to keep pH constant at maximum/plateau yield. 
The lime rates are reported in the respective table of results. Results indicate that with the 
quadratic model, 318.2 kg ha-1yr-1 of lime is required to keep pH constant in relation to 
56 
 
annual additions of 156 kg ha-1 of N. With the non-stochastic LRP, 526.7 kg ha-1yr-1 of 
lime is required to offset acidity from applications of 220 kg ha-1 yr-1 of N and keep the 
pH constant. With the stochastic LRP, the producer will apply 303.8 kg ha-1 of lime to 
offset acidity from annual application of 149 kg ha-1 of N. Lime requirements obtained 
with a stochastic LRP and a quadratic model are very close to the estimates 
recommended by Bolan et al. (1991). 
 
Conclusion 
This study aimed to determine the effect of considering the cost of lime on 
recommendations about the optimal level of N. To achieve this objective, the study 
modeled soil pH change in response to N timing and rate, and lime application, and 
determined the effect of soil pH and N on forage yield.  
Optimal levels of N fertilizer and soil pH were greatly affected by the choice of 
the yield function. The stochastic LRP fit the data best. Considering the cost of lime 
reduced recommendations about the optimal level of N. At current input and output 
prices, and based on the stochastic LRP, the optimal level of N was reduced by 11.3 % 
from 168 kg ha-1 yr-1 to 149 kg ha-1 yr-1 by considering the cost of lime due to N 
fertilization. 
Acidification potential due to N fertilizer increased at an increasing rate 
(nonlinearly) as N rate increased. Nitrogen acidification appears to be more severe with N 
application amounts above consumptive levels of the crop than with N that is used by the 
plant. Although the timing of N application had little effect on forage yield, splitting N 
into two applications for fall and spring may be of benefit by reducing acidification due to 
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excess N fertilization. Minimizing leaching of −3NO  by matching fertilizer rates to crop 
requirements would substantially reduce acidification from applying N. Model 
predictions of N acidification found in this study compared well with theoretical 
predictions.  
Current recommendations of how much N to apply from the Noble Research 
Foundation for rye-ryegrass pasture are to apply between 112 to 224 kg ha-1 yr-1. Based 
on the estimates of the stochastic LRP, this amount should be adjusted to 149 kg ha-1 yr-1 
with pH at least 5.88.  
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Figure 1. Annual soil pH change over time in limed plots and unlimed plots. Soil pH 
is the mean of spring and fall measurements averaged over N rate.  
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 Figure 2. Average soil pH variation with varying levels of applied N fertilizer. 
 
62 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. Effect of liming and N fertilization on rye
Yield is the annual total average ov
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-ryegrass forage yield.
er three replications. 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Relationship between annual mean rye
Note: Soil pH is the mean of spring and fall measurements. Dry matter yield is the annual 
total average over three replications
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-ryegrass forage yield and soil pH.     
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5. Estimates of quantity of 
varying levels of ammonium nitrate (34
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lime needed to neutralize acidity produced by 
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Table 1. Mean estimates of soil pH in limed and unlimed plots across years.   
Lime Crop year 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Yes 5.24a* 5.15a 5.08b 5.00b 5.41c 5.85e 6.55f 6.67f 6.48f 6.27h 
No 5.12a 4.96b 4.91b 4.86b 4.65d 4.61d,g 4.57d,g,m 4.61d,g 4.58d,g,m 4.50g,m 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Yes 5.98i 5.70j 5.85ek 5.63k 5.4c,l 
No 4.48g,m,n 4.46m,n 4.35n 4.37n 4.36n           
*Means with a common superscript are not significantly different (α=0.05)
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for effect of N rate, and N rate*lime on pH and yield.  
N Rate 
(kg ha-1 yr-1) 
 
Lime 
(kg ha-1 yr-1) 
 
Soil pH Forage yield 
Mean pH 
(kg ha-1 yr-1 ) SE 
Mean yield 
(kg ha-1 yr-1) SE 
0 no 4.84a* 0.0705 4646.91h* 527.95 
0 yes 6.02b 0.0698 5566.07h 525.04 
112 no 4.76a 0.0593 7039.37i 527.95 
112 yes 6.01b 0.0593 7974.41i,j 527.95 
168 no 4.72a 0.0593 7279.61i,j 527.95 
168 yes 5.92b 0.0593 8599.23j,k,l 527.95 
224 no 4.75a 0.0491 7130.41i 446.20 
224 yes 5.87b 0.0491 9273.71k,l 446.20 
336 no 4.52c 0.0498 6729.83i 463.04 
336 yes 5.71d 0.0498 9596.97l 463.04 
448 no 4.46c 0.0498 6821.7i 463.04 
448 yes 5.47e 0.0498 9861.04l 463.04 
          *Means with a common superscript are not significantly different (α=0.05)
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for regressions of rye-ryegrass response to N and soil pH using the  
linear response plateau (LRP) yield function. 
Dependent variable:  
Yield(1000 kg ha-1)    Non-stochastic LRP Stochastic LRP 
Parameter Symbol Estimate SE Pr>|t| Estimate SE Pr >|t| 
Intercept w/N 0β  4.51 0.14 <.0001 2.97 0.16 <.0001 
N (100 kg ha-1) 1β  1.90 0.21 <.0001 4.29 0.29 <.0001 
Intercept w/pH 0γ  -6.48 0.83 <.0001 -1.00 0.103 <.0001 
pH linear slope 1γ  2.50 0.17 <.0001 0.34 0.02 <.0001 
Split N (fall and spring) dummy 2β
 
-0.66 0.21 0.0069 -0.48 0.37 0.2119 
All N applied in spring dummy  3β
 
-0.45 0.21 0.047 -0.54 0.31 0.1042 
Plateau yield tP  8.69 0.18 <.0001 8.31 0.17 <.0001 
Crop year random effect tu  13.58 0.37 <.0001 15.23 0.45 <0.0001 
Variance of error term tε  3.61 0.14 <.0001 2.61 0.10 <0.0001 
Plateau random effect  tv  - -  7.01 0.76 <0.0001 
  
      
Optimal pH *pH  6.06 0.12* <.0001 5.88 0.09 <.0001 
Optimal N (100 kg ha-1)** *N  2.20 0.24 <.0001 1.49   
Optimal Lime (kg ha-1 yr-1) *L
 
526.68***   303.83   
-2Log likelihood  5286.60   4934.40   
* Standard errors of *N and *pH  were calculated by the delta method. 
**Price of N $0.99 kg-1, cost of liming $.035 kg-1, and price of forage $0.096 kg-1. 
***Optimal lime rates were calculated based on *N  obtained for the specific yield function. 
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Table 4. Parameter estimates for regressions of rye-ryegrass response to N and soil 
pH using the quadratic yield function. 
Dependent variable: Yield 
(1000 kg ha-1)       
 
Parameter Symbol Estimate          SE Pr>|t| 
Intercept 0α  -18.81 3.29 0.0001 
N (100 kg ha-1) 1α  1.91 0.17 <0.0001 
N2  2α  -0.25 0.03 <0.0001 
pH 3α  7.43 1.22 <0.0001 
pH2 4α  -0.52 0.11 0.0007 
Split N (fall and spring) dummy 5α
 
-0.02 0.06 0.7354 
All N applied in spring dummy  6α
 
0.03 0.05 0.6529 
Crop year random effect tu  9.20 0.34 <0.0001 
Variance of error term tε  4.05 0.18 <0.0001 
  
   
Optimal pH *pH  7.19 0.38 <0.0001 
Optimal N (100 kg ha-1) *N  1.56 0.15 <0.0001 
Optimal Lime (kg ha-1 yr-1) *L
 
318.21   
-2Log likelihood   5367.80    
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Table 5. Parameter estimates of the regression of soil pH change. 
Dependent variable: ∆pHt         
Parameter Symbol Estimate SE Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0η  1.068 0.522 0.1776 
Cumulative lime (kg ha-1) 1η  5.1E-5 1.9E-5 0.0069 
Cumulative N (kg ha-1) 2η  -6.0E-6 2.9E-5 0.0338 
Cumulative N2 3η
 
-3.62E-7 0.00000 <0.0001 
Time trend 4η  -0.05 0.052 0.3446 
Cumulative N2*FS 5η
 
7.98E-8 0.00000 <0.0001 
Cumulative N2*S 6η
 
-3.61E-8 0.00000 <0.0001 
Variance of error term tu  0.12310 
Year random effect tε  0.23730 
Plot random effect is
 
0.00412 
-2Loglikelhood value   449.50     
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ESSAY III 
 
 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA’S COTTON INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR PRODUCERS’ INCOME AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY  
 
Abstract:  
This study provides an economic explanation of the preference for vertically integrated 
monopsonies in the cotton sector of West Africa, and contrasts monopsony with other 
market structure alternatives in terms of welfare and sector efficiency. Based on a 
principal agent framework, in the presence of credit and or factor market constraints, as 
well as capital market failure, the integrator increases sector welfare and efficiency by 
supplying inputs on credit. Equilibrium outcomes with the principle agent model indicate 
that under the parastatal vertical integration market structure, growers receive the 
reservation income to participate in cotton production. Free markets entail more equitable 
distribution of benefits than with parastatal vertical integration or competition-
monopsony market structures.  Since most producers are credit constrained, removing the 
integrated cotton parastatals in favor of competitive market structures would result in 
little cotton being grown and reduce social welfare. The basic policy implication is that 
promotion of a competitive market system will not support cotton productivity growth 
unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs to develop national input supply 
systems and credit markets.  
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Introduction 
The cotton sector has often been considered a role model for agriculture 
commercialization and industrialization in West Africa’s cotton producing countries: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali8. The sector was built around public cotton 
(parastatal) companies that are vertically integrated (Badiane et al. 2002; Tschirley et al. 
2009). Historically, vertical coordination between growers and cotton companies took the 
form of contractual arrangements. Cotton companies provide major non-labor inputs 
(seed, pesticides, fertilizers, and extension services) and purchase all cotton produced by 
farmers at guaranteed prices (Badiane et al. 2002). Growers cultivate cotton and deliver 
the harvest to the cotton company to repay the input credit. The parastatal cotton industry 
model promoted cotton cultivation and facilitated the sector’s growth after independence 
in the early 1960’s (Badiane et al. 2002; Baffe 2007).  
Despite the success in promoting cotton cultivation, the state-led contract 
production model was criticized for being inefficient and for paying producers prices 
considered to be below the competitive level (Pursell and Diop 1998; World Bank 2000; 
Badiane et al. 2002). In the early 1990’s, these criticisms led to structural reforms9 
supported by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other donor institutions 
(Baffe 2007; Tschirley et al. 2007). Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the case for reform 
was made in other cash crop sectors including coffee, cocoa, and cashew that received 
government support. With a central emphasis on market forces, these reforms have 
                                                          
8
 These countries are often referred to as the West African cotton four (C-4) because of the significance of 
cotton to their economies. They also utilize a common currency, the CFA franc which is fixed against the 
euro.  
9
 The reforms mainly included reducing government support programs in the input and output markets; 
developing private-sector based markets and building the technical and commercial capacities of producer 
associations.  
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attempted to promote a competitive agricultural sector with less government 
involvement. Competition is expected to increase producer prices and spur production at 
the farm level. The nature and pace of implementation of the reforms has varied from 
country to country, but have mostly been slow and less far reaching, especially in 
Francophone West Africa (Tschirley et al. 2008, 2009).  
West African governments (except Chad10) partially liberalized the cotton sectors 
and allowed the entry of two to three new ginning11 companies (in each country) 
operating as monopsonies over geographic cotton producing areas. The parastatal 
industry structure has, however, been maintained with many of the popular characteristics 
of the traditional model preserved. The role of government in decision making has been 
reduced and producers’ involvement and share holding in cotton companies increased. 
Farmers have been organized into regional and national producer organizations to have 
power when bargaining for cotton prices and other contractual production terms (Poulton 
et al. 2004; Baffe 2007; Tschirley et al. 2008). The parastatal industry model was 
maintained because of the benefits it provides, including its ability to reduce producer 
price risk, credit facilitation, and technology transfer (Kaminski et al. 2009). The recent 
increase in cotton production within the region has been attributed partly to the 
implemented reforms (Fadiga et al. 2005; Kaminski et al. 2009). The increase in 
production may also have been propelled by other factors such as the recent world cotton 
price increase (Figure 1).  
                                                          
10
  In Chad, the momentum for reform has weakened following the country’s discovery of crude oil. Crude 
oil has displaced cotton as the main source of export revenue for the government, and has caused 
government energy and attention to focus away from the cotton sector (Baffe 2007).  
11 In Benin, three more companies were recently allowed to operate gins and market cotton.  
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Figure 1. World price of cotton. (“A” Index is a proxy of world price of cotton). 
      Source: National Cotton Council of America, 2011. 
 
Despite the economic reforms, there still remains controversy regarding the 
parastatal vertical integration industry model. Growers still complain about the level of 
producer prices received as a percentage of world prices of cotton (Badiane et al. 2002; 
Fadiga et al. 2005; Sumner 2006; Tschirley et al. 2009), and that the gains from contract 
arrangements accrue largely to cotton companies while growers receive small returns 
(Tschirley et al. 2009). Price competition between cotton companies that could ultimately 
result in better prices for farmers is limited by government regulations. A commonly 
asked question is whether the parastatal vertical integration industry model is able to 
align the incentives of industry participants so that market efficiency and welfare of the 
participants within the sector improves (Tschirley et al. 2008, 2009). Can the current 
industry organization framework be justified as a viable alternative? Or, would other 
restructuring alternatives provide more benefits? There is also growing public concern 
that leaving control of the input market in the hands of cotton companies could 
potentially ‘crowd out’ private (commercial) actors which could hinder the development 
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of private input markets and lower overall fertilizer use especially on food crops (Kelly 
2006; Xu et al. 2009).  
Legislation and policies to overcome some of these concerns are being 
contemplated or developed in individual countries. One policy option is to break up the 
vertically integrated cotton parastatal market structure in favor of free12 markets in the 
input and output sectors (Tschirley et al. 2008). Another is to allow perfect competition 
(with imperfect credit and factor markets) in the input market and monopsony in the 
output market (Tschirley et al. 2009), or to maintain the status quo (Kaminski et al 2009; 
Tschirley et al. 2008, 2009). The monopoly (input market)–monopsony (output market) 
market structure13 is one other possible alternative market structure that could emerge 
following the removal of the vertically integrated cotton parastatals. These policies may 
have significant welfare costs or benefits depending on how the current industry model 
impacts producers’ welfare and sector economic efficiency. An important need is 
research to understand the link between the parastatal vertical integration and producer’s 
net return to determine whether there is an economic basis for public concern regarding 
the parastatal vertical integration market structure.  
                                                          
12
 Note that the free market structure alternative being proposed would still be characterized by credit, 
factor market and institutional constraints inherent in most developing countries. 
13
 The monopoly-monopsony market structure could potentially lead to “double marginalization” of 
producers (See Tirole 1988). Because the monopsonist and monopolist sectors independently engage in 
noncompetitive pricing behavior, traders in each industry only see the effect of their pricing on their own 
profits (Tirole 1988). Monopolistic traders have incentives to charge prices that are above competitive 
levels. This could reduce input demand, lower farm productivity and hence farm supply. The monopsonist 
would exert market power by lowering producer prices below competitive levels.  At the aggregate level, 
the monopoly-monopsony market structure could reduce social welfare and lead to potential dead weight 
loss relative to the current parastatal industry model. We do not consider this market structure as a viable 
alternative to the parastatal market structure and hence do not discuss it further in this study. 
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This paper provides an economic explanation of why West African countries have 
selected the existing market organization in the cotton sector. The specific objective is to 
determine the potential benefits and costs of removing the parastatal vertical integration 
market structure in favor of the proposed market structure alternatives. The analysis is 
supported by a conceptual model which takes into account the specific institutional 
features of the Burkina Faso and Malian cotton sectors, while the analysis and discussion 
is intended to be broader.  
 
 
Background  
Proponents of liberalization often argue that economic theory suggests that free markets 
should create positive effects of welfare increase and efficiency improvement in the 
reformed sectors (World Bank 2000). The basic theoretical argument is that competition 
should reduce monopolistic traders’ profits, increase producer prices and spur production 
as farmers respond to better prices. A major shortcoming of this argument is that it 
assumes factor markets work well and that contracts are enforced; that is, there is no 
market and institutional failures. Perfect competition is best when it is possible and there 
is no market failure. However, the assumption of no market failures is not realistic in 
many developing countries, and affects producers’ response to price incentives. It is 
essential to consider market failures in market policy design since they affect how surplus 
is created and distributed among sector agents. 
Liberalization policies advocated by donor institutions and governments often 
center on “getting prices right” by aligning domestic commodity prices with world prices 
with a view of gaining efficiency (World Bank 2000).  This policy objective has changed 
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over time, largely in response to poor economic performance in most developing 
countries (Timmer 1995). Institutional and structural barriers in many developing 
economies do not allow price policies to work well. These barriers have refocused 
development efforts on the need for good institutions to pave the way for price policies. 
According to Timmer (1986), price liberalization policies require good institutions to 
work well.   
Empirical evidence on the effects of market reforms in sub-Saharan Africa is 
mixed. In countries where competitive spot markets have emerged following 
liberalization (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana), increased output prices and significant 
reduction in production have been observed (Poulton et al. 2004; Winter-Nelson and 
Temu 2002; Gorex 2003; Makdissi and Wodon 2005). Field data from these countries 
suggest production fell due to declining input use, and lack of extension services which 
affected farm productivity (Tschirley et al. 2009; Winter-Nelson and Temu 2002). 
Empirical evidence indicates farm productivity is higher among West Africa’s C-4 
countries compared to countries that completely liberalized such as Uganda, and 
Tanzania (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Farm productivity in selected countries. Yield is expressed in lint 
equivalent. Data is from USDA Foreign Agriculture Services 
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Declining input use has largely been attributed to constraints in factor markets, 
especially credit constraints and or missing input markets (Goreux 2003; Poulton et al. 
2004). While input markets are in general not all together missing in rural West Africa 
and sub-Saharan Africa, high transport costs, price risk, unfavorable weather, and 
illiteracy in the farming community limit participation. Even cotton farmers who have the 
money to purchase inputs may find it difficult to obtain them when aggregate local 
demand is not sufficient to attract private traders to remote locations. This is especially 
true when demand is spatially dispersed and unpredictable-a typical case in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Soil scientists point out that nutrients in African soils are being depleted because 
of continuous cropping without proper soil husbandry (Voortman, Sonneveld, and Keyzer 
2000; Yanggen et al. 1998), suggesting the need to use inorganic fertilizers if agricultural 
productivity is to be increased or to even maintain current productivity levels. Cotton, in 
particular, requires significant investments for profitable and sustainable production. 
Investment is required to provide inputs on an annual basis, in the medium term to 
provide credit for farm equipment, and in the long run for research and development 
(R&D) to maintain productivity and improve land husbandry. Producers’ ability to 
purchase inputs in competitive spot markets is weak because of high poverty levels, 
especially in rural areas. There is also evidence that risk aversion towards production and 
price risks inherent in agricultural production reduce producers’ incentives to make 
significant investments in input use (Ellis 1992). Evidence from the field confirms a 
much lower use of inputs and technology in cereal crops that are privately financed, yet 
field trials indicate that economic returns to fertilizer, when combined with improved 
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seed and better farming techniques can be high for most food staples (Yanggen et al. 
1998; Kelly 2006).   
Farmers’ capacity to save income from crop sales this season and use it to 
purchase inputs for next cropping season is weak due to heavy financial obligations. 
Farmers need money to pay school fees, medical costs, taxes, and sometimes finance 
family ceremonies such as weddings. The financial obligations pressuring farmers at 
harvest time are so perverse that staple food prices usually collapse at harvest time in 
many developing countries. These financial needs also prevent farmers from storing their 
crop even though returns to storage are known to be high for most cereal crops in sub-
Saharan Africa (Stephens and Barrett 2011).  
Formal financial lending is nearly non-existent or expensive in many rural areas 
of West Africa (and generally in most developing countries). Farmers are especially 
unable to obtain credit because: a) their assets (collateral) are inflexible – held almost 
exclusively in the form of family land; (b) most farms are relatively small to act as 
collateral; and c) information asymmetries between growers and lenders lead to problems 
of adverse selection, moral hazard, or costly verification (Blancard et al. 2006). These 
problems make borrowing expensive. Moreover, the farmer cannot pledge his future 
harvest as security to a formal or informal credit institution because of the riskiness of the 
harvest value. 
The private sector has been unwilling or lacks incentives to provide long term 
investments in the input supply system and in R&D. In 2000 for instance, private-sector 
investment made only 1.7% of total agricultural R&D spending in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Pardey et al. 2006). In West Africa, a key disincentive for private agents to provide 
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inputs is anticipation that competitors will free ride on inputs provided (Baffe 2007; 
Delpierre 2010), which is due partly to the existence of weak (or lack of) institutions for 
formal contract enforcement in most developing countries (Poulton et al. 2004; Tschirley 
et al. 2008; Delpierre 2010). The private sector is often guided by short-term profit 
interests: without long-term vested interests in a sector, traders are unlikely to make the 
required investments to develop and sustain a sector. Pray, Oehmke, and Naseem (2005) 
argue that investments in R&D require a certain degree of market power so that 
companies that invest can reap the benefits from the innovation.  
Globally, vertical integration has emerged as a response to growers’ credit 
constraints and in some cases as a way to provide long term investments in sector 
development and sustainability (Vukina 2001; Sexton et al. 2007; Swinnen and 
Vandeplas 2010; Ciaian and Swinnen 2009). In West Africa, though criticized, cotton 
companies have been successful in providing input credit and making long term 
investments in R&D. Alongside input provision and innovation, institutional organization 
is also important. Contract vertical integration enables efficient coordination along the 
production, processing and marketing chain. 
Vertical integration is also emerging in the agricultural sectors of many 
developing countries as a means to provide quality and cost advantages. Evidence 
suggests integrated cotton companies in West Africa have outperformed other market 
structures in the sub-Saharan region in terms of lint quality (Tschirley et al. 2009). Lint 
quality is associated with price premiums and thus increases the prices that integrated 
cotton companies can pay producers. Monopolies can have cost advantages when there 
are economies of scale that may reduce transaction costs (Swinnen, Sadler, and 
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Vandeplas 2007; Ciaian and Swinnen 2009). Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) observe that 
if monopoly or monopsony structures contribute to reducing market failures and if 
transaction costs are substantially lowered, efficiency gains may result from concentrated 
market structures.  
Other studies conclude that oligopsony market structure can be economically 
efficient for industries that exhibit high transportation costs, large investment into 
specialized equipment, and specialized needs of processors (Richards, Patterson, and 
Acharya 2001).  In West Africa, economic surplus generated by cotton parastatals has 
been an engine of economic development, particularly in rural areas. The construction of 
schools, roads and hospitals and the provision of agricultural extension services have 
benefited from financial resources provided by cotton parastatals (Tschirley et al. 2009; 
Vitale et al. 2009). 
Despite these benefits, some scholars argue that the linkages associated with 
concentrated vertical market structures present conditions conducive for monopoly firms 
to cheat growers through unfair pricing of output and or inputs, or through other contract 
terms (see Sivramkrishna, and Jyotishi 2008; Swinnen, Sadler, and Vandeplas 2007). 
These claims are also being made in many emerging and developed countries in the food 
sector where expansions of supply chains are affecting growers and society as a whole 
(Reardon et al. 2009). In West Africa, the poor incentive system is said to contribute to 
allocative inefficiencies and to the persistence of poverty in rural areas. This has led to 
persistent calls for deeper reforms in the cotton sector with a view to counter the 
perceived market power of cotton companies. In view of these contrasting outcomes, 
contradictory policy advices are found in many developing countries. Additional 
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theoretical and empirical insights are needed to guide policy and address some of the 
current controversies.  
 
Theoretical framework 
We develop a theoretical framework based on the fact that small scale producers in 
developing countries face credit and or factor market constraints. The role played by 
cotton companies in alleviating these constraints and welfare effects (including 
distribution) are examined within a principal agent framework. After presenting some 
theoretical considerations, we calibrate the theoretical model to provide empirical 
evidence. First we develop producers’ response functions. 
 
Producer response functions 
Consider a farm household that is endowed with land, jk, labor, lm, and capital, K, 
available for financing input purchases. A typical farm household in West Africa’s C-4 
allocates farm resources to the production of crops which mostly are maize, millet, 
sorghum and cotton. Maize and cotton are usually found in the same cropping system 
because they require similar levels of rainfall and soil nutrients (Coulibaly 1995; Vitale et 
al. 2009), yet growers do not necessarily grow both crops. In practice, cotton requires a 
crop rotation to maintain an adequate soil nutrient balance and to minimize pest pressure. 
Maize benefits from this rotation by deriving residual benefits from fertilizers applied on 
cotton. West African farmers typically use a three-year rotation of cotton-maize-maize 
(Vitale et al 2009; Coulibaly 1995). We do not consider rotation constraints in our 
framework. For simplicity we consider the two crops: maize and cotton. Let j  be the 
acreage allocated to the ith crop (i = c if crop is cotton and i = m if crop is maize), 
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n  op, q the per acre production function with o. , .  a concave function of xi and 
li, li is labor and xi is a vector of non-labor inputs (including seed, fertilizer, pesticides, 
and herbicides) used on the ith crop.  
The producer’s farm profit maximization is:  
               maxpr,sr,tr u  ∑ wop, q  px  yqz j                                                  (1) 
   s.t.  
   
∑ px { |  
   
∑ j { jk ;  ∑ q {  lm   
where pi is unit price of the ith crop output, y is the wage rate, and r is the price vector of 
x. We assume that the farm household’s decisions in (1) are made sequentially: first is to 
choose input levels and then allocate land, i.e. variable input and land allocation decisions 
are separable. The maximization in (1) has three constraints that affect producer’s 
responses. First is the credit constraint which restricts payments of purchased inputs to 
the household’s cash on hand, K. The second constraint is land. With competitive markets 
and regular nonjoint technologies, individual producers choose the profit-maximizing 
allocations of land subject to the land constraint. The third constraint is labor. This 
constraint restricts total labor use to the available household labor, lm. The formulation 
indicates that households are not credit constrained with respect to labor- a typical case in 
West Africa since farm households rely on family labor. For simplicity, assume that the 
labor constraint is not binding. Assuming the usual regularity conditions on (1), such as 
strict concavity hold, solutions to (1) may be obtained.  
Focusing on the effect of credit constraints and or factor market constraints, we 
establish the equilibrium without credit constraints as the reference point. Producer 
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response functions are derived from (1) by Hotelling’s lemma. The first order conditions 
for optimality with respect to xi and li are: op   and os  y, respectively. The first 
order conditions and the land constraint determine factor demands with a non binding 
credit constraint obtained in the form: p.  p, , y, jk, and q.  q, , y, jk, with 
supply n.  n, , y, jk. The maximization in (1) with no credit constraints ensures 
that inputs are allocated or applied to the level where their marginal value products are 
equal to their respective market prices. This is the neo-classical equilibrium, and assumes 
that credit and or factor markets work perfectly.  
With credit constraints, the farm profit function is represented by the Lagrangean: 
           l  ∑ wop, q  p  yq  ~p  |  jk  ∑ jUU z           (2) 
where ~ is the shadow price of the credit constraint assuming that K makes the credit 
constraint binding (~> 0), and η the shadow price of land. The shadow price of the credit 
constraint is crop specific. It is higher for input intensive crops like cotton than for crops 
like maize that require relatively less purchased inputs. When λi >0, the first order 
conditions in (2) for optimality with respect to xi and li become: op  1  ~ and 
os  y, respectively. Unlike the case of unconstrained maximization, the first order 
conditions with a credit constraint indicate that the marginal value product of x (the credit 
constrained input) is higher than its market price by the value of ~. With credit 
constraints, demand for x and output supply are functions of available capital: p. 
p, , y, |, jk and n.  n, , y, |, jk. The household can potentially increase farm 
profits by increasing the use of inputs up to the point where op  , but is prevented by 
the credit constraint. Credit constraints have an effect of tightening input use while 
missing input markets may tighten availability. It follows that 
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p.  p, , y, |, jk  p.  p, , y, jk                                                      (3) 
n.  n, , y, |, jk  n.  n, , y, jk                                                      (4). 
That is, the more producers are credit constrained, the less inputs they apply, and the less 
the productivity. Field observations indicate (3) and (4) are consistent with empirical 
studies and reality14. In West Africa, this implies that a competitive input market system 
will not support productivity growth unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs 
to develop credit markets and the national input supply. 
To complete the producer’s decision process, we examine the land allocation 
decision. When both maize and cotton are grown, optimal land allocation is determined 
by:  
                  
!,N,,,tk
t 
!,N,,,tk
t      (5) 
which are the first order conditions of (1) involving the indirect profit function. Equation 
(5) indicates that the fixed input, land, is allocated across cropping activities to equalize 
their shadow prices. Chambers and Just (1989), and Shumway, Pope, and Nash (1984) 
show that when corner solutions exist, equation (5) still holds, but is replaced by an 
inequality. This means that the shadow price of land for crops receiving a zero allocation 
must be less than the shadow price of land for crops receiving a positive allocation. The 
outcome discussed in (3) through (5) provides incentive for firms such as cotton 
companies to either provide credit or inputs to producers.  
The input subsidy provided by the cotton company relieves the binding credit 
constraint for cotton growers which allow them to apply inputs at optimal levels. At the 
farm level, this has the effect of increasing land productivity and the marginal value 
                                                          
14
 The aggregate analogues of the response functions in (3) and (4) can be obtained by integrating farm 
level responses over all producer types and regions in a given country.  
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product of land. We assume here that the input credit and technology provided by the 
cotton company relaxes the constraints for cotton production, but the constraints may be 
binding for maize production. Generally, the input package provided by cotton 
companies in West Africa is issued under strict guidelines and cannot be used on other 
crops. According to Ellis (1992), input subsidies also reduce the risk15 perceived by 
farmers especially in circumstances where farmers’ limited knowledge about the optimal 
level of inputs causes them to limit expenditure on inputs. Apart from providing 
purchased inputs and institutional organization, cotton companies guarantee producer 
prices. This shifts price risk away from cotton producers. Price stabilization may 
stimulate investment and innovation especially for small scale risk averse farmers thereby 
generating higher output. Abruptly  
Hueth and Ligon (1999), and Key and Macbride (2003) use different methods and 
models in the tomato and hog industries in the United States and prove the argument that 
production contracts providing a low risk environment for growers lead to increased 
production over the no contract alternative farmers. Contract producers were associated 
with a substantial increase in factor productivity, and technological improvement over 
independent producers. Ammani et al. (2010) also find that liberalization of the fertilizer 
market in Nigeria significantly reduced fertilizer use and aggregate maize yield. A study 
by Theriault (2011) in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali cotton sectors also finds strong 
evidence that farms with access to inputs are more productive.  
The discussion above provides a basis for making observations about market 
policy alternatives in the input market. First, imperfections in credit and or factor markets 
                                                          
15
 Note that risk aversion can be an alternative explanation of why farmers might apply less than optimal 
inputs. 
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make spot markets non-optimal for organizing the input market. Secondly, credit and or 
factor market constraints, and weak (or absence of) institutions to enforce contract terms 
create a market failure that can be addressed by a market structure that ties together input 
and output. Due to the lack of contract enforcement mechanisms, recovering the input 
loan could be problematic if private traders supply inputs on credit. Under concentrated 
market structures, in the absence of alternative output buyers and input sellers, the gain 
from defaulting is low compared to the cost of exclusion from the input scheme. 
The framework above illustrates that farm supply (and hence aggregate supply) as 
well as social welfare can be higher under parastatal vertical integration market structure 
relative to the competitive market structure in the presence of credit and or factor market 
constraints. Social welfare increase arises primarily from improvements in resource 
allocation and bringing production (closer) to its optimal level. An issue of concern, 
however, is the question regarding who benefits from the welfare increase: the cotton 
company, producer or both? A related question is whether other market structure 
alternatives can do better relative to the parastatal vertical integration market structure. 
These are questions that we explore in the sections that follow by comparing producer 
prices and grower’s income across the proposed market structure alternatives: parastatal 
vertical integration (current market structure), competition input market-monopsony 
output market and perfect competition in both input and output markets. In the next sub 
sections, we briefly describe these market structures and the equilibrium concepts that 
characterize each.  
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Parastatal vertical integration market structure 
Contract production in agriculture is often studied using principal-agent theory (Goodhue 
1999; Hueth and Ligon 1999; Vukina 2001; Swinnen, Sadler, and Vandeplas 2007). The 
principal agent framework is used here to investigate how the cotton company could 
determine input and output prices. Under the principal-agent framework, the cotton 
grower can be viewed as an agent of the cotton company (principal, here also called 
integrator or parastatal). The standard principal-agent problem is one where a principal is 
seeking a contract with an agent that will maximize the principal’s expected utility or 
profits. In the West African cotton sector, contracting is aimed at combating credit and or 
factor market constraints, enabling technology transfer and risk sharing. Generally, cotton 
companies bear price risk while growers bear yield risk. Typically, a grower has a 
production contract to use the cotton parastatal’s technology and inputs, but on the 
grower's land. It is assumed that both the integrator and the grower act in an individually 
rational way to maximize individual expected utilities or profits.  
There are two constraints involving the grower, typical in a traditional principal 
agent problem as discussed by Varian (1992) and Anderhub et al. (2002). First, the 
participation constraint (PC) assumes that the producer has a reservation level of income, 
and the cotton company must ensure that the farmer gets at least this reservation income 
in order to be willing to participate. Typically, the reservation level of income is 
determined by the farmers’ alternative option- the grower’s expected income without 
contracting. The second constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which 
in this context, gets the grower to use the level of inputs that the cotton company 
considers optimal. It is assumed here that the cotton company has information regarding 
90 
 
the profit maximizing input level and or growers cost structure and actions. One 
argument to motivate this assumption is that cotton parastatals have gained knowledge of 
the farming system through the provision of extension services and R&D. However, there 
is noise in the system since the relationship between input and output cannot be known 
with certainty. The cotton company must design an incentive schedule that does well on 
average. More generally, the PC is necessary to guarantee that the grower agrees to the 
contract, while ICC is necessary to align the interests of the cotton parastatal and the 
grower (Anderhub et al. 2002).  
Based on the assumptions established above, the cotton company’s profit 
function,uJ, is specified as:  
     MaxN,! uJ  '  ( nJ', , y, jk( 
                                                  J  pJ., , y, jk  nJ                               (6) 
               s.t. u, , , , y, jk|contract      
                                                    u', , , , y, |, jkno contract                          PC                        
                               pJ.  argmax u, , , , y, jk|contract                            ICC                                                               
where pw is the world price of lint cotton,  is the producer price (lint equivalent16) set 
by the cotton company, nJ is cotton farm supply (lint equivalent), pJ.  is the optimal input 
package determined by the integrator for cotton production, J is the unit price at which 
the cotton company procures pJ.  from the competitive input market,  is the price at 
which the cotton company charges producers for pJ. , Z is the variable processing, 
                                                          
16
 Lint is obtained after ginning seed cotton that farmers produce. If we need to compare world prices and 
farm gate prices at a one to one level, then we would multiply world prices at the ginner’s gate by the 
ginning efficiency ratio. Within the region, ginning efficiency ratio is estimated to be 42% (Kelly et al. 
2010; Tschirley et al. 2009). 
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transportation and marketing costs,  is the price of maize,  is the price of p the 
quantity of non-labor inputs used for maize production. Note from (6) that ginners are 
price takers in the world lint market. Production from West Africa’ s C-4 accounts for 
about 3% of world cotton production and only about 8% of world exports. Cotton 
demand is presumed to be perfectly price elastic. Equation (6) states that the cotton 
company’s profits equals the price margin multiplied by lint quantity, less input and 
processing costs. The quantity of seed cotton ginned is influenced by the price of seed 
cotton and input prices the company offers in the contract.  
The question of interest regards the design of the optimal contract and the 
resulting welfare effects. Varian (1992) demonstrates that if the principal has full 
information regarding the agent’s production technology (and or utility), the ICC would 
not be binding on the principal’s maximization. The principal designs an incentive 
structure that maximizes the optimal choice or minimizes production costs. Conceptually, 
the principal's need to provide an incentive compatible contract drives a wedge between 
its costs and the agent’s utility/profit-maximizing (and or production cost minimizing) 
production decisions (Goodhue 2000; Varian 1992). Consequently, in the optimal 
solution, the agent only receives the minimum rent necessary to accept the contract. Thus 
a cotton company ultimately exerts market power on labor and land, but not on purchased 
inputs. Under the current market arrangement, the cotton company does so by subsidizing 
inputs to avoid producer’s capital constraint and taxing output by lowering prices to meet 
the reservation level of income. 
 Experimental research and empirical studies, however, show that agents’ often 
reject contractual offers that imply unfair surplus sharing (Anderhub et al. 2002; Fehr and 
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Schmidt 1999), and that principal’s contractual offers imply less unequal surplus sharing 
than predicted by standard agency theory (Keser and Willinger 2000; Anderhub et al. 
2002). In practice, agents’ choice to accept contractual relationships also depends on 
aspects outside the participation constraint and ICC. Such aspects that may influence 
contract terms include agents’ bargaining strength, reciprocal effort choices (Anderhub et 
al. 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999), and government regulations that set price ceilings and 
floors. Although the agency theory suggests that parastatal market structure in the West 
African cotton sector may foster the formation of market power, whether in fact it arises 
and in what form are empirical questions.  
 
Competition input market-monopsony output market  
Under the competition-monopsony market structure, it is proposed that cotton producers 
procure inputs from competitive spot markets, but cotton parastatals be maintained as 
regional monopsonies. In reality, reform measures in the input market will only be 
partially successful in getting competitive prices to cotton farmers because credit 
constraints and imperfections in factor markets will still remain. Input prices are likely to 
lie somewhere between monopolistic and perfect competition. Focusing on the effect of 
monopsony buyer power, standard economic theory predicts that the key to monopsony 
rents is restricting output supply and driving prices down below competitive levels. In 
West Africa, cotton parastatals have no incentive to restrict output because cotton 
demand in the export market is perfectly elastic.  
The question is whether competition-monopsony market structure would be any 
better than vertical integration in the West African cotton sector in terms of price 
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competitiveness and or economic benefits. As noted, producers maximize profits from 
farming through land allocation decisions: cotton area and production will decline when 
cotton prices decline or costs of production increase relative to maize, the other crop 
option. Abstracting from the principal agent framework described in the preceding 
subsection, the monopsony ginner’s profit function is specified as 
                 max! uJ  '  ( nJ', J, y, |, jk(  nJ                                     (7)   
               s.t. 
       u, , , , y, |, jk|contract   
                                                      u', , , , y, |, jkno contract                   PC                        
where J is the price of pJ in the competitive input market. The monopsony would 
exercise market power by choosing output price, but the maximization is constrained by 
the grower’s maximization through land allocation decisions. Maximization of (7) 
establishes the equilibrium in the output market. Input demand function with credit 
constraints derived from equation (1) is pJ', J, y, |, jk(. The market equilibrium under 
perfect competition is determined at a point where demand equals supply which is 
perfectly price elastic17. Assuming a downward sloping input demand function, the 
equilibrium input demand would be obtained according to  
                                       pJ', J, y, |, jk(  J.                                                              (8) 
Note that input prices are exogenous to the monopsonist’s objective function. If demand 
and supply functions are known, equation (7) and (8) can be solved jointly to determine 
the equilibrium outcomes using either analytical or mathematical programming methods.   
 
                                                          
17
 Dead weight loss would occur if input supply is not perfectly elastic 
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Free market (input and output markets) 
A free market is the most efficient type of economic organization in the absence of credit 
and or factor market constraints. In West Africa’s C-4, the proposed free market structure 
alternative would still be characterized by market failures in capital markets and 
institutional constraints. In a free market, it is assumed that the input market is dominated 
by many private suppliers and ginning companies have no monopsony control over 
farmers; cotton prices paid to farmers are determined competitively using world cotton 
prices. Creating competition is not an easy task. For instance, in Ghana, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, private input suppliers and ginners did not step in as quickly or as effectively as 
desired following liberalization of the input and output markets (Poulton et al. 2004; 
Winter-Nelson and Temu 2002).  
With a free market, producer prices are linked to world lint prices. An increase (or 
decrease) in the cotton company’s variable costs and world prices is transmitted through 
the marketing system to producers. Under the current pricing system in West Africa’s C-
4, the ex ante negotiation of producer prices annually means that market price shifts are 
transmitted with a lag, and temporary movements may not be transmitted at all. The 
market equilibrium under a free market is determined at a point where demand equals 
supply.  
As noted above, the equilibrium input demand with credit constraints would be 
determined from pJ', J, y, |, jk(  J, while if no credit constraints, equilibrium input 
demand is determined from pJ', J , y, jk(  J. We consider both cases for comparison 
purposes. In the output market, the market equilibrium is established as 
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                                                        nJ                                                          
(9) 
where nJ is the marginal cost of transportation, ginning and marketing. Hence, output 
price can be obtained analytically from      nJ  if the parameters are known. 
Note that the equilibrium prices must solve the grower’s participation constraint; 
otherwise farmers would grow no cotton.  
 
Empirical model  
To illustrate the potential magnitude of welfare effects of market policy, we solve 
equations (6)-(9) for a specific empirical example. To conduct the optimizations, it is 
necessary to establish specific functional forms for the input demand and farm supply 
functions specified in general form in equations (3) and (4). Cotton is assumed produced 
using one composite18 input (seed, fertilizer, insecticide and herbicide) according to the 
law of the minimum (LoM) production technology. This formulation has been found to 
provide a reasonable representation of yield functions (Paris 1992; Lanzer and Paris 
1981). 
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumptions: First, output from 
each crop depends only on the amount of inputs allocated to it-non joint production 
technology, and that the household’s cash on hand is sufficient to purchase enough inputs 
to plant all land to maize. Second, assume that under the current market structure, there 
are no private seed cotton buyers19, which means growers have no option to produce 
                                                          
18
 This assumption is made for analytical convenience, but the argument developed is valid with multiple 
inputs. The assumption also implies if the production process requires that the non-labor inputs be used in 
fixed proportions. 
19
 Generally, private seed cotton markets are absent because of government regulations that restrict entry. 
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cotton other than under contract with the cotton parastatal. The second assumption is 
relaxed when considering liberalization alternatives that allow perfect competition. These 
assumptions imply that growers’ land allocation decisions can be analyzed as a discrete 
choice. That is the grower chooses either to plant all land to cotton or all land to maize. A 
grower will contract with the cotton parastatal to allocate his/her land to cotton 
production as long as the expected income/utility from cotton production exceeds that 
from the alternative option-maize.  
Let  n  min E  F,  be the per ha production function for the ith crop (i = 
c if crop is cotton and i = m if crop is maize), E is a constant (intercept) representing 
yield if no input x is applied; b is the input productivity parameter and  is the expected 
plateau (average) yield. Generally, the use of purchased inputs on maize is low and 
farmers can still harvest maize even if they do not apply purchased inputs (Coulibaly 
1995; Vitale et al. 2009), which means E , 0, but the same is not true for cotton, i.e. 
EJ is close to zero. Since cotton production is more input intensive than maize, it 
requires more capital per acre to produce. Letting r be the price of x, the variable cost of 
cotton production per ha is J. The producer’s profit function is specified as  
                       max u  Jmin EJ  FJ , J  JJ.                                          (10) 
Equation (10) will exhibit constant positive marginal product when J , EJ  FpJ and 
indicates that  should be applied until its marginal value product (MVP) is equal to its 
marginal factor cost (MFC).  
With the law of the minimum (LoM) production technology, optimal input use is 
either the level required to reach the plateau or zero depending on the input-output price 
ration. However, assumingEJ  0, equation (10) indicates that with zero input use, no 
97 
 
cotton production occurs. Hence optimal production will require the level of J necessary 
to reach the plateau: 
                        J  J F⁄                                                                                                   (11)                           
Under contract cotton production, the cotton company will provide the optimal input 
amount or price incentives to enable producers to apply the optimal amount. Substituting 
(11) into the production function, farm supply is obtained. 
Without a contract, the farmer obtains inputs from private (free) input markets 
and faces credit constraints. The farm profit maximization is represented by the 
Lagrangean:    
                 lJ , ~  Jmin EJ  FJ, J  JJ  ~|  JJ                               (12) 
where ~ is the shadow price of the credit constraint. With an active credit constraint, the 
marginal value product (MVP) of x is higher than its market price by a value of the 
shadow price of the credit constraint, i.e. J minEJ  FJ , J  J1  ~. Input use 
under credit constraints is determined by  
                   J  N                                                                                                          (13) 
which is the F.O.C of the credit constraint.20  
The response functions in (11) and (13) are used to parameterize the empirical 
models for each of the market structure scenarios described in equations (6) to (8). Our 
results are, of course, sensitive to the choice of functional form of the production 
technology used, but nonetheless, useful in identifying and quantifying some potential 
effects that might flow from liberalization.  
                                                          
20Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) and Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (2004) use a similar approach.  
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Data  
For world cotton price, we use the Cotton A index price, which is the world reference 
cotton price, obtained from the National Cotton Council of America reported in US$/lb 
and transform it to US$/kg. The world price used is the average world price for the period 
1999/2000 -2005/2006 (Table 1). The estimated average price for the period 1999/2000 -
2005/2006 is $1.22/kg lint equivalent (Table 1). A sensitivity analysis is conducted by 
varying the price to see the effect of price changes on equilibrium outcomes. Estimated 
ginning, transport and marketing costs for the period 1999/2000 -2005/2006 are included 
in Table 1. An examination of costs in Table 1 indicates that the average variable cost for 
the ginning company is $0.46/kg of lint exported.  
 
Table 1. Ginning and FOB-to-CIF Costs for 1999/2000-2005/2006 
Crop Year 
World 
Price 
($/kg) 
Exchange 
Rate (f/$) 
Domestic 
Transport 
(f/kg)  
Ginning 
Costs 
(f/kg) 
Sea 
Freight 
($/ton) 
Marketing 
Costs 
($/ton) 
1999/2000 1.2 649 60 230 65 36 
2000/2001 1.27 731 65 245 60 38 
2001/2002 0.97 731 70 225 55 29 
2002/2003 1.16 648 71 220 60 35 
2003/2004 1.47 555 72 215 55 38 
2004/2005 1.23 524 73 220 55 32 
2005/2006 1.24 535 75 225 60 32 
Average 1.22 624.71 69.40 225.71 58.57 34.29 
Source: Tschirley et al. (2009).  
 
 
The average estimated cost of purchased inputs for cotton and maize (excluding 
labor) is included in Table 2. The estimated total cost for cotton production technology is 
approximately $172.98/ha, while for maize it is $87.69/ha. With this technology and in a 
normal season, average seed cotton yield in the region is approximately 1200 kg/ha, or 
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504 kg/ha lint equivalent (Vitale et al. 2007; Baquedano and Sanders 2008), which means 
the producer’s cost of purchased inputs per unit produced is $0.144. The high value crop-
cotton requires more capital to produce than maize. We assume the household’s cash on 
hand, K, is sufficient to purchase inputs used for maize production, i.e. K=$87.69. Field 
surveys in this region indicate average maize yield is approximately 1500kg/ha (Yanggen 
et al. 1998; Baquedano and Sanders 2008). Maize price used is average producer prices in 
Burkina Faso for the period 1999-2005 as reported by FAOSTAT. The price of maize is 
US$0.16/kg. We do a sensitivity analysis by varying these prices to US$0.24/kg which is 
the average 2008/2009 season prices as reported by FAOSTAT. 
  
 Table 2. Average Cost (US $/ha) of the Technology Package  
Crop 
NPK 
(kg/ha) 
Urea 
(kg/ha) Seed Fertilizer Insecticide Herbicide Total 
Cotton 150  50 49.42 72.54 36.67 14.35 172.98 
Maize 100  50 3.19 58.19   26.31 87.69 
Source: Baquedano and Sanders (2008) and Tschirley et al. (2009). 
 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, research approximating technical coefficients is generally 
scarce. There are few case studies that can be used to guide empirical analysis. Using 
surveys, Theriault (2011) measured input productivity in the West African cotton sector 
and found purchased inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides) elasticity 
coefficient to be ~0.7 in Burkina Faso, and ~0.57 in Benin. Other studies report for 
individual factor inputs especially for nitrogen. Kelly (2006) reported that 1kg of 
nitrogenous fertilizer increased cotton yield by 7kg in Mali. Ruben and van Ruijven 
(2001) estimated that in southern Mali, 1kg of nitrogen fertilizer increased cotton yield by 
0.09%. The study by Theriault (2011) is a useful example to guide our empirical analysis 
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since they also consider purchased inputs as a composite package. The input productivity 
parameter (b in equation (10)) is assumed to be 0.7, and is varied to 0.57 to show the 
effect of technology on model outcomes.  
 
Procedure 
The maximization in (6)-principal agent problem- is solved analytically. The problem 
objective function to be maximized is  
max!,N u  '  ( . minEJ  FJ , J  J  J 
                                                                             . minEJ  FJ , J                      (14)             
Constraints: 
                    . minEJ  FJ , J   . J   . n   .  
                 J  MP Q 
                J  | 
where n is the expected (average) maize yield per hectare in the region, J is the 
average cotton yield, and J is the price at which the cotton parastatal procures J in the 
competitive input market, and Z is the unit variable processing and marketing cost. The 
estimated market price of purchased inputs is approximately $0.144 per unit. The choice 
variables for the cotton parastatal are grower output price () and input price (). Note 
that the solution for the maximization of (14) is not unique. Any input and output price 
combination that maximizes (14) and solves the participation constraint is optimal. The 
input price reported in this analysis is the highest price the principal (integrator) can 
charge and satisfy the agent’s credit constraint:   |/J where J  J/F. Under this 
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formulation, growers have to use all of their cash on hand (K) to purchase inputs from the 
integrator. The input price  is then substituted into (14) and the problem solved 
analytically to obtain a producer price  that maximizes the principal’s objective 
function and satisfies the participation constraint. Equilibrium outcomes are reported in 
the results section.    
The maximization problem in the competition-monopsony structure is solved 
analytically as in (14) above. For comparison purposes, the problem is solved under two 
scenarios: with and without credit constraints. With a credit constraint, the problem is set 
up as:  
max! u  '  ( . minEJ  FJ , J 
                                                                             . minEJ  FJ, J                      (15)             
Constraints: 
                    . minEJ  FJ , J  J . J   . n   . p 
                   J  |/J   
where J is the competitive price of purchased inputs used for cotton production. With no 
credit constraint, J  |/J is dropped from (15) and input use becomes J  MP Q. Note 
that the participation constraint must be solved in order for grower’s to participate in 
cotton production.    
  The solution to the free market structure is obtained analytically. For comparison 
purposes, the problem is solved under two scenarios: with and without credit constraints.  
To obtain the price received by the grower (lint equivalent) under free market (, 
average domestic transportation cost (D), sea freight cost (F), insurance and marketing 
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cost (M) of lint cotton are subtracted from the world cotton price. This gives a proxy for 
the world cotton price at the ginners’ gate or FOB price. We then subtract average 
ginning costs (G) to obtain the domestic price in lint equivalent:  
                           4    .                                                          (16) 
Deflating  by the ginning efficiency ratio will give domestic prices in seed cotton 
equivalent of world price. Given the producer’s response functions with and without 
credit constraints as derived above, economic effects of a free market in the input and 
output markets on producer are determined analytically. Results for the market structure 
alternatives are considered in the next section.  
 
Simulated results and discussion 
Results from the principal agent model 
The solution is not unique. The highest input price that the principal can charge and 
satisfies the grower’s capital constraint is $0.12/unit of input. With $0.12 input price, the 
principal pays agents $0.48/kg lint cotton equivalent to satisfy the agents’ participation 
constraint (Table 3). This solution suggests that the principal subsidizes input prices to 
ensure producers purchase the optimal amount, but extracts the entire surplus above the 
grower’s reservation income (Table 3).  The reservation income level is determined by 
the maize market, and is $152.31/ha.  
Note that the assumed functional form of the grower’s (agent’s) production 
technology and input productivity parameter affects the optimal level of the input 
selected by the principal, and hence the price charged for inputs. For instance, if the 
grower’s production technology is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas type production 
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technology, prices received by growers could decrease as the world price increases. In the 
optimum, the principal provides more inputs as world prices increase. Production 
increases because input demand increases under this production technology as world 
price increases. Growers, however, receive only their reservation income and any 
increase in surplus created through increased production is extracted by the principal. 
When the input productivity parameter is changed from 0.7 to 0.57, more inputs would be 
needed to achieve the maximum potential yield. The principal provides more inputs or 
reduces the price charged for the inputs for agents to purchase what is considered the 
optimal input amount. 
Under the cost structure stated above, empirical results suggest that cotton 
production is possible if world lint price is at least $1.10/kg (Table 3). Below, $1.10/kg 
and with the participation constraint active, no cotton is produced because the integrator 
must ensure the grower gets the reservation income level. Results indicate that as world 
price increases, the principal keeps all of the added surplus as predicted by standard 
principal agent theory. Experimental research shows, however, that the principal shares 
more of the surplus than predicted by the theoretical model (Anderhub et al. 2002; Keser 
and Willinger 2000). In West Africa, parastatals adjust their pricing strategies to varying 
market conditions including changes in the participation constraints. It is also often 
observed that producer prices increase as world prices increase suggesting that the supply 
function is less perfectly inelastic than implied by the model.   
Results suggest that economic surplus is maximized when the principal provides 
inputs at a price cheap enough to avoid the credit constraint. The principal could also 
provide inputs for free and receive rents from output. In practical terms, the cotton 
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company must charge a small price for its inputs to limit usage to the level considered 
optimal. This controls the risk of inefficient input use (over application), diversion on 
other crops, or even resale on the secondary market. Goodhue (2000) argues that the 
principal increases profits by controlling input use.  
 
Table 3. Equilibrium Economic Outcomes from the Vertical Integration Model 
World 
Price 
($/kg) 
Producer 
Pricea 
($/kg) 
Input  
Price 
$/unit 
Grower’s 
Income 
($/ha) 
Parastatal 
Profit 
($/ha) 
Total 
Surplusb 
($/ha) 
1.00 0.48 0.12 152.31 0.00 - 
1.10 0.48 0.12 152.31 11.13 163.44 
1.20 0.48 0.12 152.31 61.53 213.84 
1.22 0.48 0.12 152.31 71.61 223.92 
1.30 0.48 0.12 152.31 111.93 264.24 
1.40 0.48 0.12 152.31 162.33 314.64 
1.50 0.48 0.12 152.31 212.73 365.04 
1.55 0.48 0.12 152.31 237.93 390.24 
1.65 0.48 0.12 152.31 288.33 440.64 
aOutput prices depend on the price the principal charges for the inputs 
bTotal surplus generated per ha is the sum of grower’s income and parastatal’s profit  
 
Reducing the price of cotton relative to the price of maize increases the 
importance of maize production to cotton, suggesting producers are likely to shift to 
maize production. Increasing price of maize increases the producer’s reservation income 
level, and hence increases the price the cotton company must pay producers to participate 
in cotton production.  For instance, when price of maize increases from $0.16/kg to 
$0.24/kg, the reservation income (participation constraint) increases from $152.31/ha to 
$272.31/ha.  
At the aggregate level, producers are heterogeneous. Farmers differ in terms of 
their farm size, income sources, resource endowment, and management abilities. These 
differences can affect the aggregate outcomes realized with production contracts. For 
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cotton production among the West Africa’s C-4, field studies indicate that some growers 
consistently perform better than the average while others consistently perform worse 
(Theriault 2011). If the cotton parastatal knows growers’ types and can restrict each type 
to their reservation income or utility level, the parastatal could potentially price 
discriminate and increase profits and hence social welfare by designing different 
contracts for the different grower types. However, such discrimination would increase the 
parastatal’s market power. There could also be information costs for search of optimal 
contracts for agent types. Contracts that do well on average reduce information costs for 
search, but may be inefficient. Perhaps the best way to discriminate in the context of 
cotton production in West Africa’s C-4, is by establishing regional pricing strategies. 
Grower variability is likely less within a region than between regions in a given a 
country. Production contracts designed based on a more homogeneous region could be 
more efficient than an average production contract designed for heterogeneous regions in 
a country, but could increase the market power position of the cotton parastatal. 
 
 
Results from competition-monopsony market structure 
Equilibrium outcomes indicate that the objective function of the monopsony is 
maximized when the cotton company pays growers a reservation price that solves the 
participation constraint. Equilibrium outcomes for competition-monopsony market 
structure are presented in Table 4. For producer’s not credit constrained, the reservation 
price that solves the participation constraint is $0.51/kg and the world cotton price has to 
be at least $1.10/kg for the monopsony cotton company to remain economically viable. 
For growers credit constrained, the reservation price that solves the participation 
constraint is $0.56/kg and the world price has to be at least $1.20/kg (Table 4).  
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The price that solves the participation constraint for credit constrained growers 
depend on the grower’s cash on hand. If producers’ cash on hand is less than the assumed 
K=87.69, the participation price would have to be higher than $0.56/kg.  The result 
demonstrates that output price has to be higher for credit constrained growers to 
participate in cotton production than for producers not credit constrained under the 
competition-monopsony market structure. Under credit constraints, there is potential 
welfare loss due to production not being optimal. The credit constraint leads to lower 
input use and hence less than what is optimal is applied and or not all land will be 
planted. This leads to less farm supply. In the case of West Africa, credit constrained 
farmers are the majority of the farmers implying aggregate welfare could suffer. Note 
also that our model imply a perfectly inelastic supply function at the farm level and 
dictates that there is no dead weight loss associated with the pricing behavior of the 
monopsonist. In reality, the supply function is less inelastic than implied by our model 
which means the equilibrium under the competition-monopsony market structure would 
be associated with some dead weight loss. 
Results from the competition-monopsony market structure suggest that surplus 
due to increasing world prices would accrue to the monopsonists while the grower 
receives only the reservation income. It appears competition-monopsony market structure 
would not be any better than the parastatal vertical integration market structure in terms 
of welfare distribution among sector agents, and could potentially lead to social welfare 
loss in the presence of grower’s credit constraints.   
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Table 4. Economic Outcomes from Competition-Monopsony Modela  
With Credit Constraints Without Credit Constraints 
World 
Price 
($/kg) 
Producer 
Priceb 
($/kg) 
Grower 
Incomeb 
($/ha)  
Parastatal 
Income 
($/ha) 
Total 
Surplus 
Producer 
Price 
($/kg) 
Grower 
Income 
($/ha)  
Parastatal 
Income 
($/ha) 
Total 
Surplus 
0.90 0.51 152.31 - 152.31 - 
1.10 0.51 152.31 11.13 163.44 0.56 152.31 - 
1.20 0.51 152.31 61.53 213.84 0.56 152.31 28.55 180.86 
1.22 0.51 152.31 71.61 223.92 0.56 152.31 37.08 189.39 
1.30 0.51 152.31 111.93 264.24 0.56 152.31 71.18 223.49 
1.40 0.51 152.31 162.33 314.64 0.56 152.31 113.80 266.11 
1.50 0.51 152.31 212.73 365.04 0.56 152.31 156.43 308.74 
1.55 0.51 152.31 237.93 390.24 0.56 152.31 177.75 330.06 
1.65 0.51 152.31 288.33 440.64 0.56 152.31 220.37 372.68 
aThe model assumes that cotton producers procure inputs from competitive spot markets, but cotton  
parastatals be maintained as regional monopsonies. The model is solved with the participation constraint active. 
bGrower’s income is the per hectare revenue less input costs for cotton production.
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Results from free market (input and output markets) model 
Equilibrium outcomes for the free market in the input and output sectors are included in 
Table 5. Equilibrium prices presented in Table 5, suggest that producers would benefit 
more from increasing world cotton prices than with other market structure alternatives. 
Note that with a free market, producer prices are linked to world lint prices. An increase 
(or decrease) in the cotton company’s variable costs and world prices is transmitted 
through the marketing system to producers. 
Farm incomes for producers with and without credit constraints under the free 
market structure are included in Table 5 (last two columns). Results suggest that 
producers not credit constrained would benefit most in a free market structure alternative 
(Table 5). Producers without credit constraints apply inputs at optimal levels, attain the 
maximum production potential, and hence benefit from increased world cotton prices 
through increased revenue per ha. Input use for credit constrained farmers is constrained 
by the household’s available capital. 
Results suggest that free input and output market structure would guarantee cotton 
production for credit constrained farmers if world lint prices are $1.20/kg and growers 
receive $0.63/kg (Table 5). Below $0.63/kg, the grower’s participation constraint is not 
solved; suggesting farmers are likely to shift to maize production. For producers not 
credit constrained, the participation constraint is solved if world lint prices are $1.10/kg 
and growers receive $0.53/kg (Table 5).   The result demonstrates that output prices have 
to be higher for credit constrained growers to participate in cotton production than for 
producers not credit constrained.  In the context of West Africa’s C-4, farmers’ are likely 
even more credit constrained than assumed in this study.  
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Total surplus generated under vertical integration (Table 3) is the same as the 
grower’s income under free market without credit constraints (Table 5). This result 
demonstrates that the monopoly/monopsony firms do not always lead to inefficient 
production due to price-setting behavior.  Under a free market, economic profits for the 
cotton company would be zero. Surplus gains (losses) due to increasing (decreasing) 
world cotton prices accrue to the producer. Results demonstrate that gains from the free 
market relative to vertical integration would be distributional rather than welfare 
enhancing. Free markets allow the surplus captured by the cotton company under 
monopolistic/monopsonistic conditions to be transferred to growers.  
The perfectly inelastic supply function implied by our analytic framework dictates 
that dead weight loss associated with imperfect markets is zero. In reality, the supply 
function is less inelastic which means the equilibrium under the competition-monopsony 
and parastatal vertical integration market structures would be associated with some dead 
weight loss. Since dead weight loss is eliminated under free market structures, total 
surplus generated under a free market could potentially be higher than with other market 
structures. Surplus generated under the free market with credit constraints (Table 5) is 
less than surplus generated under vertical integration (Table 3). This demonstrates that in 
the presence of credit constraints, the integrator increases sector welfare and efficiency 
by controlling or supplying inputs. Varian (1992) points out that the comparison between 
monopoly and competitive output levels under similar cost structures may be flawed, 
because a monopolist/monopsonist can only exist in an imperfect market. The 
monopolist/monopsonist may have a different cost structure, including a downward-
sloping marginal cost curve, from that of the (long run) total cost structure of the 
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perfectly competitive market. This suggests that the efficiency advantages of parastatal 
vertical integration market structure relative to a free market structure with credit 
constraints may be under estimated.    
 
Table 5. Economic Outcomes for Free Market Structure  
World Price 
($/kg) 
Producer 
Price ($/kg) 
Grower’s 
Incomea ($/ha) 
Grower’s 
Incomeb ($/ha) 
0.77 0.20 -2.99 -2.44 
0.8 0.23 12.13 10.35 
1.00 0.43 112.93 95.61 
1.10 0.53 163.33 138.23 
1.20 0.63 213.73 180.86 
1.22 0.65 223.81 189.39 
1.30 0.73 264.13 223.49 
1.40 0.83 314.53 266.11 
1.50 0.93 364.93 308.74 
1.55 0.98 390.13 330.06 
1.65 1.08 440.53 372.68 
aGrower’s income without credit constraints.  
bGrower’s income with credit constraints. Assumes some land is not planted due to credit 
constraint. 
 
 
Conclusions and final remarks 
This study provides an economic argument for the importance of vertical integration 
market structures in the cotton sector of West Africa, and contrasts vertical integration 
with other market structure alternatives in terms of welfare and sector efficiency. Based 
on a principal agent framework, in the presence of credit constraints, the vertically 
integrated firm increases social welfare by subsidizing inputs to overcome the producer’s 
credit constraint. The negative impacts of cotton parastatals in West Africa seem 
overstated by opponents of the parastatal vertical integration market structure given the 
credit constraints for most producers.  
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Equilibrium outcomes indicate that under the principal agent framework, growers 
receive only the reservation income necessary for growing cotton to be preferred to 
growing the alternative crop, corn. In practice, however, the principal will share more of 
the surplus than predicted by theory. One way to ensure the integrator provides more 
equitable contract terms is by empowering growers by strengthening producer 
organizations to be able to demand more equitable contract terms. Thus, current efforts 
by West Africa’s C-4 cotton producers’ to form producer organizations and strengthen 
them should be supported by policy makers. The other way is financial participation by 
increasing the share holding of producers (or producer organizations) in cotton 
companies.  This would provide an opportunity to reduce managerial slack and to initiate 
external audits aiming at controlling the management. 
Removing the integrated cotton parastatals in favor of competitive market 
structures could impact negatively on the income of growers who are credit constrained, 
but would benefit growers without credit constraints. Since the bulk of the farming 
households in West Africa are credit constrained, social welfare may suffer if the vertical 
integration market structure is removed in favor of the free market structure. 
Competition-monopsony market structure will not be any better than the parastatal 
market structure in terms of benefit to producers. In the presence of credit constraints, 
competition-monopsony market structure is welfare reducing relative to the parastal 
market structure. Under a free market with no capital market failures, surplus captured by 
cotton companies would be transferred to growers. 
 The basic policy implications follow: Imperfection in the credit and or factor 
markets make spot markets non-optimal for organizing the input market. Credit and or 
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factor market constraints, and weak (or absence of) institutions to enforce contract terms 
create a need for a concentrated market structure that ties together input and output. 
Promotion of a competitive input market system will not support cotton productivity 
growth unless stakeholders pursue complementary programs to develop national input 
supply systems and credit markets.   
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